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Abstract 
The prison population of the United Kingdom is the largest in Western Europe. It 
has been operating beyond its designed capacity for over 20 years. This paper 
addresses the root causes of this overcrowding and why despite a 42% reduction 
in crime, the overcrowding problem continues to worsen. A simulation model has 
been built to explain system structures behind the overcrowding behaviour pattern, 
and to understand the long term effects of policies which in the short term appear 
to slow the increase in overcrowding. This model explores how feedbacks from 
overcrowding can affect both judicial and policymaker behaviour. Through the 
application of the system dynamics method this model provides policy makers with 
a tool to understand the dynamic problem of overcrowding, to improve planning of 
when and how to implement future policies, and improve forecasts of future prison 
population trends. 
Key words: prison, system dynamics, overcrowding, management, policy design, England 
and Wales, prison population, model, penal, prison, criminal justice. 
 7
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I have been very lucky to have ever patient advice of my supervisor David Wheat. 
His constant clear guidance has been invaluable not only in the writing of this paper but 
also in developing much deeper insights into the real world applications of System 
Dynamics. My meetings and conversations with him have always been fruitful and have 
helped me to organize my ideas in clear understandable terms. In specific areas of my 
model his help and encouragement has taken my work into new directions which would 
otherwise not have been possible. 
 
I would also like to thank Professors Pål Davidsen and Erling Moxnes for their 
instruction in my first year of System Dynamics. Thanks also go to the other students of 
my system dynamics class. Special thanks is made to Sebastian, Frode, and Dennis without 
who’s help this thesis would not have been possible.  
 
Thanks also go to the Douglas McKelvie at Symmetric, and the team at the Ministry 
of Justice for taking the time to help in forming the initial ideas used in this model. 
 
Finally thanks to Heidi for patiently putting up with me through the process of 
writing.
 8
Introduction 
 
“…the prisons crisis had been both predictable and predicted…” 
(Morgan 2008) 
 
Over the last 15 years the number of prisoners in England1 has almost doubled, rising 
more quickly than any other European country (Ministry of Justice, 2008). The capacity of 
the prison system to house prisoners has been increasing every year, but at a slower rate 
than the growth of the prison population. The discrepancy between prison capacity and 
prison population has resulted in increasing numbers of prisoners crowded into shared 
prison cells. Overcrowded prison conditions have been linked to increasing levels of 
prisoner suicide, disobedience, and recidivism (European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture 2005, Ministry of Justice, 2008). Whether through control of prison capacity or 
control of prisoner numbers, the prison needs long term solutions to its capacity problems.  
 
Previous studies of the prison system have attempted to model links between the police, 
courts and the prison system. In England the National Offender Management Service 
(NOMS) controls the management of prison and probation services. The model in this 
paper is intended to aid in NOMS long term strategy for controlling overcrowding. The 
basic model traces the critical path from sentencing to release, and incorporates feedbacks 
of recidivists re-entering the prison system. The basic structure is intended to increase 
understanding of the effects of building delays, sentence length changes, and different rates 
of recidivism. The paper proceeds beyond previous models. In line with research in the 
field of criminology and psychology the model endogenizes sentence lengths, and 
recidivism rates through modeling the structure of perceptions of the systems performance 
and the influence of that perception on prison overcrowding. There is a growing body of 
work by researchers such as Julian Roberts linking the difficulties encountered in reducing 
overcrowding to a lack of understanding of the different perceptions and goals of the 
judiciary, public, and politicians. This paper takes these perception problems and builds 
them into a model of the punishment system. System dynamics models have overlooked 
the role of misperception in penal policy, choosing to focus on the interrelationships 
between different agencies in the Criminal Justice Process. It was felt that modeling the 
mental models of the groups within society that affect the behavior and structure of the 
                                                 
1
  This paper refers to the jurisdiction of England and Wales as England. The other parts of the United 
Kingdom: Scotland and Northern Ireland have independent parliamentary control of their justice systems. 
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criminal justice system could prove to be a key tool in the creation and implementation of 
new policy. 
 
Seven main sections and an appendix follow this first introductory section. The second 
section reviews the current penological and system dynamics literature. The third section 
provides a definition of the dynamic problematic behavior of prison overcrowding between 
1988 and 2008. The fourth section describes the hypothesis for overcrowding implicit in 
the model structure, paying particular attention to feedbacks and delays. The fifth section 
analyses the model, and describes how the validity of the model has been tested. The sixth 
section is an analysis of the effects of different policy modifications designed to reduce 
overcrowding. The final section concludes the paper with recommendations and 
implementation issues. 
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 Literature review  
 
“impossible policies start with far fetched resolutions.” 
(Neil Kinnock, Guardian Oct 1985) 
 
 The predominant purpose of this chapter is to survey the literature on prison population 
growth, as this is the primary driver for prison capacity expansion (Cavadino 2008, Bourne 
2005). The chapter begins by exploring the relationship between the growth of public 
punitive demands and the growth of the prison population. A discussion is then made of the 
effect of public punitiveness on judicial decision making, and the problems of judicial 
policy resistance. This leads onto a discussion of misperceptions of the workings of 
deterrence and an overview of the variables which are currently believed to reduce re-entry 
into the prison system. The chapter continues with an overview of system dynamics models 
relevant to the prison system. The chapter concludes with a summary of the intended 
contribution of this study to system dynamics criminological research. 
 
Statements in the media and political reports 
The mandate of Her Majesty's Prison Service is to serve the public by keeping in 
custody those all those committed by the courts (HM Prison service). The investigation into 
the causes of overcrowding must therefore examine what the public wants, and why. 
Examination of headlines from the national press is illustrative of the current public 
demand for punishment: “Shocking figures show judges are jailing fewer criminals” (Daily 
Mail, 28 February 2007), “Soft judges, derisory jail sentences and the subversion of 
justice” (Mail on Sunday, 12 May 2005), “Judges on Trial: we demand end to soft 
sentences” (Sun, 12 June 2006)2. Such headlines imply that the public perceives sentencing 
to be too lenient. Rhetoric and press statements from both government and opposition have 
appeared to come into line with the public mood since the mid early 1990’s. “Society needs 
to condemn a little more and understand a little less” (John Major 1993, Mail on Sunday), 
“If the criminals think they can get away with it they will. And at present far too many do” 
                                                 
2
 Extracted from Hough and Jacobsen (2008) 
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(Tony Blair 1993, Sun)3 . The public perception and political rhetoric appears to have 
impacted the decision making of judges4 in individual cases.  
 
The 2007 government commissioned Carter report looked into the problem of prison 
overcrowding, and concluded that the growth in prison population was reflective of the 
public interest. The result of changes to legislation and sentencing pattern were found to 
have increased the use of prison as a punishment by a quarter and reduced the use of fines 
by the same amount. Sentence lengths were found to have increased, whilst numbers of 
people arrested and sentenced were found to be broadly constant since 1996. The 2007 
report has been widely criticized for relying on limited evidence for public support for 
prison population growth to justify deep changes to the sentencing powers of the judiciary 
and a large scale prison building program (Justice Committee 2008, Newburn 2007, Hough 
et al 2008, Green 2007, Lacey 2008).  In an independent report by the prison reform trust, 
designed to look at changes to sentencing recommended by Carter begins with a clear 
undiluted warning: 
“Simply constraining sentencers’ discretion, without addressing the 
underlying pressures for tougher sentencing, is a not a viable, long-term 
solution to the prisons crisis.”(Hough et al 2008) 
 
Hough summarized academic commentary on the emergence of increasingly populist, 
punitive, law and order focused policies apparent in the electoral rhetoric of 1992. Despite 
serious concerns over overcrowding problems in the mid 1990’s the majority of legislation 
developed since the 1992 election seem designed to increase the prison population: the 
1993 Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill reduced the use of cautions and the right to 
silence, the Crime Sentences Act 1997 introduced automatic life sentence for second 
violent offences and mandatory minimum sentences for drugs and burglary.  Mandatory 
sentencing has continued to grow with each successive Criminal Justice Act5 (Hough et al 
2008). Lacey (2008) has described the developments in political punitiveness as a case of 
                                                 
3
 This was also the year of the murder of two year old Jamie Bulger. For further examples of political reaction 
to this murder, and the wider implications for public perception see Green (2007). Tim Newburn (2007) 
provides a comprehensive history of the development of political rhetoric since 1992. 
4
 One recent example being a statement during sentencing in the Court of Appeal: “offences of this kind have 
escalated …. and in the public interest this crime must be confronted and stopped” (R v Povey, McGeary, 
Pownall and Bleazard [2008] EWCA Crim 1262) 
5
 As has judicial policy resistance: (16 Mar 2009 Daily Telegraph).   
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politicians being trapped in their own “prisoners dilemma” 6 , as securing popularity 
overrides ideological and policy concerns.  
 
Academic Analysis 
Tim Newburn (2007) has suggested that a part of the explanation for the growth in 
punitiveness could be a time lagged response to rising crime. Newburn (2007) reached his 
conclusion by assuming that historic incarceration rates are reflective of public 
punitiveness. He then compared incarceration rates to recorded crime figures over the last 
25 years. He found that the rise in reported crime before the 1990’s did not correspond with 
a rise in incarceration. The rise in incarceration rates was found to be steepest when 
reported crime was falling after 1995. Newburn (2007) also theorized that a time lag exists 
between actual crime rates and public perceptions of crime. His evidence for this came 
from analysis of responses to the British Crime Survey in 2005. Three fifths of the 
respondents to the survey erroneously believed that crime was increasing. The public 
respondents to the British Crime Survey have been wrong on the direction of the crime rate 
since the data was first collected in 1996. Respondents to the British Crime Survey have 
also demonstrated a lack of knowledge as to the true sentence lengths for crimes, even 
when a mandatory minimum sentence has been applied in response to public pressure 
(Roberts  2003).  
 
Tony Bottoms (1983) has been critical of the effect of growing punitiveness on the 
English system of punishments. Traditionally “serious offenders” have received long 
prison sentences, whilst fines and non-custodial penalties have been reserved for “less 
serious offenders”. Bottoms (1983) stated that the dividing line between “serious” and “less 
serious” offenders is unclear, and any harshening of penalties for the “serious offender” 
would eventually lead to harsher penalties for the “less serious offender”. The Mair and 
Mills (2009) report into non-custodial penalties found some evidence for Bottoms’ 
argument. Sentencers have been given more non-custodial penalty options in recent years 
in an attempt to divert people away from the prison system. Mair et al (2009) presented 
evidence that sentencers have reacted to directives to increase the use of non_custodial 
penalties by becoming more punitive; ratcheting punishment up rather than scaling it down. 
                                                 
6
 There are several variants of the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory. Typically, two participants are required 
to play the roles of suspects under interrogation for armed bank robbery. They face the choice of betraying 
the other or staying silent. If both stay silent, they face a six month sentence for possession of firearms. If 
each betrays the other, they both face five years in prison. If only one betrays the other, he goes free and his 
co-conspirator gets ten years. The dilemma illustrates problems of trust in competitive situations: mutual 
distrust results in mutual betrayal, and thus in sub-optimal outcomes for both participants. (Hough et al 2008) 
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Non-custodial penalties were found to be applied when previously only a fine would have 
been given (Mair et al 2009).  
 
Mair et al (2009) also found an increase in the imprisonment rate for those breaching 
the terms of non-custodial penalties. It has been suggested that the increasingly punitive 
law and order driven political environment has increased the risk aversion of parole and 
probation services (Collins 2007). Non-criminal breaches of parole and probation license 
conditions have been an increasing reason for sending offenders to prison (Mair et al 2009, 
Padfield 2006). Mair et al (2009) also observed that offenders with previous non-custodial 
penalties were also found to have a higher probability of imprisonment if convicted of a 
later offence. 
 
It has been asserted that pressure for harsher penalties and longer sentences lies in 
the model of general deterrence that forms the backbone of the justice system (Cavadino  et 
al 2008, Kleiman 2009, Becker and Landes 1974). Wheat (1972) provided an economic 
model of general deterrence within the Boston heroin market. Wheat’s (1972) work 
hypothesized that offenders are rational actors who make a mental cost benefit analysis 
before embarking on a crime. Increasing the potential cost for a crime will decrease the 
commission of a crime. The most prominent application of rational economics to criminal 
justice was conducted by Becker (1974). Both Becker (1974) and Wheat (1972) calculate 
the potential cost of a crime with the following equation:  
Cost of sanction = probability of sanction * length of sentence.  
Hernandez and Dyner’s (2001) system dynamics model of overcrowding in 
Colombia relied on this equation and reached the conclusion that an increase in sentence 
lengths will in the long term reduce the prison population. Though a similar conclusion has 
been used to justify the increase in English political punitiveness the importance of 
sentence length on deterrence has been questioned for some time.   The results of Robert’s 
(2003) examination of the British Crime Survey responses indicated that even highly 
publicized changes to sentence lengths did not have a strong long term affect on public 
perception. If the visibility of sentence lengths is low this implies that the deterrent effect 
of sentence length is also low (von Hirsch et al 1999). Kleiman (2009) has also theorized 
that the further away each consecutive portion of the sentence was from the commission of 
the offence the more its effectiveness diminishes.  
 
 14
Researchers have observed a similar affect on the detrimental impacts of 
punishment (Orsagh and Chen 1988). Orsagh et al’s (1988) study of prisoners convicted of 
robbery in the US indicated that as sentences became longer, expected legitimate earnings 
and employment opportunities decrease. Orsagh hypothesized that “because of the loss of 
contact with the job market, expected earnings and employment in illegitimate activity 
increase” (Orsagh, T. et al 1988).  Similar effects have been described in English 
publications (Boune 2005). If Orsagh and Kleiman’s arguments are true the weight of the 
probability of punishment should be much higher than that of the length of sentence. But as 
has been apparent from the nature of media reporting it is the length of sentence which has 
had the greater influence on public policy and debate.  
 
From analyzing the prison statistics Hedderman (2008) concluded that prisoner 
reconviction rates have risen throughout the period of prison population growth. The rise in 
reconvictions may be due to increases of people on short sentences, who have lost 
employment, accommodation and contact with their support networks without the 
provision of rehabilitative work either in prison or afterwards (Hedderman 2008). Harper 
and Chitty (2005) summarize research conducted into “what works” to reduce recidivism. 
The highlighted areas included raising educational levels, reducing drug use and providing 
proper treatment for the mentally ill. Philips and Votey’s (1981) analysis of 
macroeconomic data also found a link between employment and offending. It is however 
difficult to be sure reductions in reoffending are causally linked to rehabilitation programs. 
Harper et al (2005) did find a general reduction in reoffending among offenders taking part 
in rehabilitation schemes, but also found a rise in offending by people who started but did 
not complete rehabilitation schemes. Numbers of these non completers will rise in 
overcrowded prison systems where offenders are regularly moved in the interest of space 
requirements (Bourne 2005). Recidivism statistics show that violent offenders have lower 
reconviction rates than “less serious” burglary and drugs offender categories – potentially 
because they are more likely to complete rehabilitative programs (Hedderman 2008). A 
study into the recidivism of long term prisoners released on parole found them 12% less 
likely to commit a violent offence (Ellis et al. 1998). Ellis suggests that this is because of 
their parole supervision. Non custodial reconviction rates have consistently proved to be 
lower than prison reconviction rates. 
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Modeling and system dynamics 
The existing models of the English prison system concentrate on of mental health 
treatment capacity, for specific groups of prisoners. Findings from two of these models 
found the delivery of treatment programs to be highly sensitive to unpredicted rises in 
prisoner population (Smith et al 2004). The findings of these papers indicate that 
overcrowding does have a detrimental effect on rehabilitation and therefore on recidivism. 
Neither model attempted to create a prison system wide analysis.  
 
There are three existing system dynamics models which look at larger scale prison 
populations and capacity development. Hernandez et al’s (2001) Colombian model, 
mentioned earlier, provided a basis for examining deterrence. A model of the Dutch 
criminal justice system has been created (Rouwette et al 2007). Rouwette’s model is the 
most similar to the one in this paper. Rouwette incorporated the influence of judicial 
perception on average sentence lengths and the affects of capacity shortages. Rouwette 
dealt with the problem of overcrowding by extending an idea put forward by 
Wolstenholme (2004): an increase in caseload in one part of the criminal justice system 
creates overcrowding, which results in the early release of prisoners. The lowering in crime 
from the increase in arrests are only short term as prisoners released early due to capacity 
problems add to the crime problem (Wolstenholm 2004). The dynamics of these models 
provide the basis for our examination of overcrowding however, it was felt that it is 
possible to incorporate the effects of increased police and court caseloads by beginning the 
model at the sentencing stage.  
 
The most comprehensive system dynamics style of model covering the English 
prison system is the stock and flow model created by Grove and MacLeod (1998). Grove 
and MacLeod separated prisoners into serious and petty offenders. Both offender groups 
are recruited as a constant fraction from the total population. Both offender groups have 
constant recidivism rates. The difference between the two groups is the level of these rates. 
This model forms the basis for the long term prison projections currently used in England. 
The model does not however try to endogenize sentence lengths, or deal with the problem 
of matching capacity and demand. To find work that looks directly at the capacity problem 
we have to look at system dynamics models in other subject areas. 
 
Sterman (2000) provides an example from the development of road infrastructure. 
Tackling the problem of traffic jams is tackling a problem of capacity overutilization. The 
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traditional and intuitive solution to traffic jams is to build more roads. According to Braess 
Law the addition of capacity to a crowded network can be detrimental to its performance 
(Sterman 2000). Increasing the number of roads adds to the popularity of road use and 
increases traffic further. (Sterman 2000) Increasing capacity tackles the symptoms of a 
problem, but in fact worsens the long term situation. If the same solution is applied over 
and over again a vicious and destructive spiral will emerge. 
 
Tabacaru’s (2007) work in the field of Human Resources provides a route to 
examining how sentencing policy changes. Tabacaru suggested that insight into policy 
decisions could be made by making the intangible variables in a system, such as attitudes 
tangible. If her hypothesis is applied to the prison system Newburn’s (2007) theorized 
relationship between punitiveness and crime levels becomes a strong basis for analysis of 
the growth in demand for prison capacity. If the way punitiveness is accumulated over time 
can be affected, it may prove an effective measure for tackling overcrowding without 
building more prisons. 
Summary 
In this chapter we have reviewed the existing literature on the two main sources of 
prison population growth: increased punitive demand and levels of recidivism within the 
system. After reviewing the literature it was clear that three factors have remained 
unaddressed by system dynamics models of the criminal justice system: 
• How the demand for punitiveness can potentially be understood by examining the 
public perception of crime levels.  
• The extent to which recidivism can be affected by changes in post release 
observation and by diversion from prison.  
• Whether increasing capacity is a viable method for tackling prison overcrowding or 
if it will just increase the prison population.  
This study combines these factors into a single system dynamics model in the hope that 
it can aid in the construction of policies to reduce prison overcrowding. 
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The Dynamic Problem 
 
Overcrowding is defined as the ratio of population and capacity. Figure 1 displays the 
growth of overcrowding alongside the trends in Prison Population and Prison Capacity 
development. 
 
Figure 1:Prison Population, Capacity and Overcrowding from 1988 to 2008. 
(Offender Management Statistics 2008, Prison Statistics 1995) 
Between 1988 and 1993 there was a significant reduction in overcrowding as the prison 
population fell and prison capacity began to increase. Prison population and capacity have 
been increasing since 1993. Overcrowding has been on a growth trend since 1993 but there 
have been two drops in overcrowding. The largest reduction occurred between 1997 and 
2000. Prison population growth had begun to level off during this period, whilst prison 
capacity continued to grow. A second reduction was visible from 2003 to 2006. The 
sharpest increases in overcrowding occurred from 1995 to 1997, and from 2001 to 2002.  
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Existing Policy Approaches 
Policy over the last 20 years has had a significant impact on the development of 
overcrowding. A general tendency has been to promote policies that increase the prison 
population before elections and after highly publicized violent offences. Such policies 
rarely take the capacity of the prison system into consideration. In the diagram below 
election years and murders are placed to the right of the prison system’s capacity utilization 
status. Policies are on the right hand side. 
 
Figure 2: Significant legislation and events affecting population development 
 
It is our view that behind the seemingly “knee jerk” reactions to events there is a 
dynamic system in operation. Understanding the structure of the system is essential to 
control its behavior. 
19 
Hypothesis 
 
The system dynamics model described in this section offers one possible 
explanation for why matching capacity and population has proved so hard to accomplish in 
the recent past. In order to avoid confusing phrases, such as negative overcrowding, we will 
from here on use the phrase prison capacity utilization7. The description of this model 
begins with a general overview of our hypothesis. A discussion centered on causal loop 
diagrams follows and highlights the main feedbacks within the model we believe are 
responsible for the system’s behavior. Then the model boundary and the reasoning behind 
our main assumptions are set out. Finally the stock and flow structure of the model is 
explained, paying particular attention to the delays and interactions between the model 
sectors. 
Hypothesis overview 
 The harshening punitive stance taken by English society in response to crime has 
been an important contributing factor in the development of the capacity utilization 
problem. There is a continual push in England for more offenders to be imprisoned for 
longer periods of time (Roberts 2003). The demands of a punitive society require 
significant, continued investment in the maintenance of the existing infrastructure and 
construction of new prisons. Planning and construction work takes time. During the 
inevitable delay between increased demand and construction completion, capacity 
shortages will occur. Once capacity utilization problems arise the rehabilitation of 
offenders becomes a secondary priority to harsh punishment and the secure housing of 
offenders. Without rehabilitation work, the problem of recidivism will worsen. Worsening 
recidivism feeds back into society’s general attitude to punishment, causing further 
demands to be tougher on crime and criminals. Such demands work to increase capacity 
needs in ways that are difficult to forecast. 
                                                 
7
 Prison capacity utilization is the percentage of capacity being used by the population. A prison with over 
100% capacity utilization is overcrowded. 
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Figure 3 summarizes our hypothesis and provides the general shape of our model. 
Two factors appear to be central to understanding punitiveness: the public’s delayed 
reaction to the crime rate (Newburn 2007), and the judicial/politically perceived rate of 
recidivism (Mair 2007, HM Prison Service 2001). The crime rate is considered an 
exogenous factor in this model8. The central hypothesis of this paper is that controlling 
recidivism is central to controlling population growth and capacity development. Policy 
makers and sentencers use the number of previous offences committed by an offender to 
assess the seriousness of offences. Reducing recidivism will reduce the perceived 
seriousness of offences. Lowering recidivism will cut off one of the direct causes of 
population growth; the increasing probability of imprisonment and sentence length 
assigned to recidivists (Mair 2007, Bottoms 1983).  
 Attitudes to punishment
•Public attitudes
•Judicial attitudes
•Political attitudes
Offender population
•Imprisonment probability
•Offender categorization
•Sentence lengths
Punishment Capacity
•Imprisonment or Probation
•Capacity Utilization
•Building delay
•Capacity depreciation
Recidivism
Exogenous
Crime Rate
 
Figure 3: Subsystem diagram 
 The rate of recidivism can be affected by investment in rehabilitation efforts within 
the prison system (Harper 2005). The problem with attempting to control recidivism is that 
high capacity utilization makes rehabilitation work more difficult to carry out. This 
dilemma provides some support for providing rehabilitative training within non custodial, 
probation based penalties.  
Causal loop diagram: Prison Capacity 
 
The simplest model of Prison Capacity Utilization features no feedback (Figure 4). 
From the literature review we can conclude that Prison Capacity Utilization increases with 
Prisoner Population growth and decreases with increases to Prison Capacity.  It is assumed 
that changing either variable will be sufficient to impact Prison Capacity Utilization.  
                                                 
8
 In our discussion of the economic equation for general deterrence (Wheat 1972, Becker 1974) the role of 
sentence lengths was found to have a little influence on deterrence or the crime rate (Kleinman 2009). 
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Figure 4: The main factors affecting prison capacity utilization. 
Figure 5 introduces the first feedback in the system. When the prison population 
increases there is pressure to allocate funds to prison building. Current examples include 
the recent calls for giant Titan prisons, and the commissioning of prison ships (British 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2010). As new prison places are built, and the size of the prison 
estate begins to catch up with the prison population, the requests for new prison 
construction should die down. In a perfect world balancing feedback loop B1 should act to 
keep prison capacity equal to the prison population. In practice it has been rare to find 
population and capacity in equilibrium (Figure 1). The disequilibrium witnessed in Figure 1 
is due to the building delay in loop B1, as it takes time to build new or replace old prison 
cells. 
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Figure 5: Prison capacity: feedback loop B1 
Causal loop diagram: Prisoner population 
Early release schemes and altered sentencing rules continue to be advocated as 
measures to cope with capacity shortages (Cavadino 2005, Council of Europe 2002, Carter 
2007). In Figure 6 balancing feedback loop B2 traces the mental model behind sentence 
length adjustment strategies. In the short term lowering the average sentence length means 
offenders stay in prison for less time – decreasing the prison population. Once the pressures 
of capacity utilization problems are reduced, sentence lengths rise again. 
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Figure 6: Sentence Length Feedbacks (balancing feedback loop R1 and B2) 
 
There is a danger that increases in sentence lengths can spiral out of control. In 
reinforcing feedback loop R1, longer sentence lengths increase the pressure to obtain 
sufficient capacity for the growing prison population. The more spare capacity there is in 
the system, the less pressure there is to reduce sentence lengths. 
The prevailing punitive trend in society is an external factor that acts to increase 
sentence lengths. According to Newburn (2007) the central drive for increased punitiveness 
is rooted in delayed social perceptions of the crime rate. The effect of the punitive trend is 
visible in the removal of automatic early release provisions in the run up to the 2010 
general election as being “soft on crime” is a potential vote loser (British Broadcasting 
Corporation,  2010).  
Within the prison system punitiveness can be affected by the number of recidivists in 
prison. The more recidivists enter the system the longer the average prison sentence will be 
(Figure 7). In the Punitive Drift Loop R2 increased capacity utilization problems arising 
from longer sentence lengths cause can reduce the delivery of rehabilitation programs and 
make recidivism worse. The tendency towards “punitive drift” can be held in check by 
building more prisons (feedback loop B4). Attempts to expand capacity in line with the 
population will still however be limited by the building delay. 
The Rehabilitation Loop B3 (Figure 7) adds further complexity to the system. 
Offenders serving short sentences rarely stay in prison long enough to complete 
rehabilitative programs (Hedderman 2008). So reducing sentence lengths could increase the 
numbers of offenders who fail to receive help in addressing the causes of their offending 
behavior. Such prisoners (especially those with serious drug problems) have an increased 
chance of recidivism. Loop B3 comes full circle as increased recidivism can be a 
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justification for longer sentences (Mair 2009), which in theory will provide more 
opportunities for rehabilitation.  
 
-
Prison
population
Average
sentence length
+
Recidivists
+
Rehabiltation
B3
-
Prison capacity
utilization
Prison
capacity
+
Prison Cells
on Order
Capacity
depreciation
-
+
Perception of
punishment
B2
Demand for
punitiveness
-
+
R2
-
R1
+
-
CRIME RATE +
+
-
Political
punitiveness +
punitive drift
sentence length
strategy
population
expansion loop
recidivist population
expansion control
B4
rehabilitation
strategy
B1
the building
strategy
 
Figure 7: Rehabilitation and the punitive drift: Feedback loops R2, B3, and B4  
 
The probability that an offender will be jailed increases with every new crime they 
commit (Figure 8 loop R3). Rehabilitation work becomes more difficult as capacity 
problems occur - and so recidivism rises further. Building more prison capacity reduces 
some of the restrictions on rehabilitative programs as prisoners remain in one place for the 
entire sentence and security concerns play a lesser role (loop B6). Again adding capacity is 
hampered by the building delay.  
-
Prison
population
Average
sentence
length
+
Recidivists
+
Probability of
imprisonment
+
B4
Rehabiltation
B3
-
Prison capacity
utilization
Prison
capacity
+ Prison Cells
on Order
Capacity
depreciation
-
+
Perception of
punishment
B2
B5
Demand for
punitiveness
-
+
R3 R2
-
R1
+
-
CRIME RATE
+
+
-
Judicial
punitiveness
+
+
+
Political
punitiveness +
rehabilitation
strategy
punitive drift
sentence length
strategy
population
expansion loop
recidivist
population control
making room for
rehabilitaion
punish recidivism
strategy B1
the building
strategy
 
Figure 8: Judicial punitiveness: Causal Loops R3 and B6 
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Causal loop diagram: Imprisonment Probability and Probation Population 
Diverting offenders from prison into punishments based upon probation is another 
strategy for reducing the use of prison capacity. Such strategies include the home detention 
curfew order, drug treatment orders, suspended sentences and community service work. 
Whilst the diversion strategy (Figure 9, balancing feedback loop B6) will reduce the prison 
population, it is not a “magic bullet”. A high caseload (probation capacity utilization) per 
probation officer will tend to reduce the rehabilitative effort that can be made towards each 
offender9. The loop B6 will ensure that probation population is tied to probation capacity. 
If probation caseloads become too high recidivism will rise and prison will become more 
popular as a punishment (loop R4). The additional strain of prisoners released on parole 
(R5 and R6) puts further pressure on probation – even though direct use of probation has 
dropped.  
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Figure 9: Diversion strategy: Causal loops B6, and R4, R5, R6 
 
Causal loop diagram: Probation Capacity 
 
                                                 
9
 Prisoners released on parole are also under the observation of probation services. So they have to be 
included in the numbers for the probationer capacity utilization. 
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Probation capacity is governed by the demand to keep the probation caseload low 
(Figure 10, reinforcing feedback loop R7). Hiring new probation staff to keep up with the 
demands of caseload takes time. If there is too high a probation caseload, staff will begin to 
leave the service (balancing feedback loop B7). Though it has not been explicitly modeled 
here the experience level of staff will also impact the efficiency of service delivery. 
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Figure 10: Probation Capacity Loops R7 and B7 
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Model Structure 
 
 
The next section presents the main components and assumptions of our model. This 
section is designed to explain the logic behind the choice of specific variables and specific 
structures. Only a selection of equations and model detail will be presented here. A list of 
equations is available in Appendix 1 and a file with the full model in iThink accompanies 
this paper. 
The model will be presented as follows in separate sections: 
• Model boundary 
• Time horizon 
• The Stock and Flow Structures 
• The framework of attitudes to punishment 
• The offender population framework 
• Serious and non serious offenders 
• Parole 
• Probation 
• The prison capacity framework 
• Quick build strategy 
• The probation capacity framework 
• Work pressure 
• Recidivism framework  
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The Model Boundary 
The variables included in this model are those considered vital for understanding 
attitudes towards the punishment system, and the interplay between capacity utilization 
problems and the performance of the prison system. 
 
Predicting the effect of prison and probation on the generation of new crimes was 
felt to be beyond the scope of this model. Research into the factors behind deterrence and 
crime generation have found a greater dependence upon policing and crime prevention 
measures such as the widespread use of car alarms (Kleiman 2009).  
We have not included the budget for penal spending as it was felt that modeling the 
budget would warrant a separate modeling effort. It was felt that the effects of budget 
changes could be replicated through the use of the adjustment times in the capacity sectors. 
The level of detail applied to each the sectors affecting overcrowding are reflective 
of the influence available to the National Offender Management Service. It is for this 
reason that the court system and the actions of the police have been summarized in a single 
delay in the Court sector. The decisions over the guilt and innocence of offenders was also 
felt to be beyond the scope of the prison system so all offenders in the model are assumed 
to be guilty. 
Endogenous Exogenous Excluded 
• Rehabilitation 
• Recidivism 
• Sentence lengths 
• Attitudes to punishment  
• Parole 
• Service Length 
• Crime Rate  
• First Time offenders 
• Training and Hiring 
Time 
• Desired Officer to 
Offender Ratio 
• Effect of budgetary and 
economic changes 
• Election cycles 
• Probation length 
• Deterrence 
• Policing changes 
• Probation officer 
experience 
• Fines and other 
diversionary 
punishments 
• Guilt/Innocence 
• Different recidivism 
rates according to time 
of release 
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Time Horizon 
The accepted government analysis period for overcrowding is 10 years (Carter 
2007).  Hedderman’s (2008) analysis of overcrowding included detail for the last 20 years. 
Her reasoning was the need to include the period before the prison population started to rise.  
We chose to follow Hedderman’s reasoning and use a 20 year time horizon from 1988 to 
2008. The periods between 1988 and 2008 is also near the limit of where reliable, coherent 
data can readily be accessed in electronic form. 
The Stock and Flow Structures 
 The stock and flow structure will be described by subdividing the structure into 
modules similar to the structure seen in Figure 3. Each of the modules will be described 
separately starting with attitudes to punishment, followed by the offender population, 
capacity and lastly recidivism will be described. In the population and capacity structures 
we will first describe a simplified structure, and then the full stock and flow diagram. 
The framework of attitudes to punishment 
 
 The framework of attitudes to punishment has two distinct parts: public attitudes 
and judicial attitudes. Public attitudes shape politicians views, and politicians shape 
sentence lengths. Judicial attitudes shape the seriousness attributed to offences and the 
probability of imprisonment. The two parts are further subdivided and described in detail 
below.  
Public punitiveness is assumed to be shaped by a delayed perception of the crime rate 
(Newburn 2007) (Figure 11). As offenders are also members of the public we have 
assumed that offender perceptions of the benefits of crime are linked to the public 
perception of the crime rate. The higher the crime rate is the more beneficial crime is 
perceived to be (Roberts 2003). We have used slightly different curves to describe the 
prisoner and probated offender’s perceptions of crime to represent the differences in how 
crime is perceived inside and outside of prison. 
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Figure 11: The public perception of crime 
The public perception of the crime rate also determines the punitiveness of the political 
climate (Figure 12). Political punitiveness is represented as a delayed function of public 
punitiveness. We have assumed that political punitiveness creates changes to statutory 
sentence lengths. A second influence on sentence lengths comes from the political reaction 
to capacity utilization. When prisons are overfull politicians are more inclined to order 
mass early release of prisoners; effectively lowering their sentence lengths.  
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Figure 12: Public and Political Attitudes to Punishment 
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The judicial attitude is shaped by the judiciary’s perception of the number of 
recidivists passing through their courts (Figure 13). The perceived number of recidivists 
influences sentence lengths (Stephenson, 1995) and the categorization of offences as 
serious or less serious (Bottoms & Brownsword 1983). The decision curves for seriousness 
and sentence length assume that the higher the recidivist fraction the more serious the 
offence and the longer the sentence. The effect on sentence length is multiplied by the 
adjusted statutory sentence to give the actual sentence length.  
The third influence of the recidivist fraction is the punitive attitude of the judiciary. 
The punitive attitude of the judiciary decides the probability of being imprisoned for any 
given crime (Mair 2009). The imprisonment fraction is used in the next section to decide 
who goes to prison and who receives probation. 
 
Figure 13: Judicial Attitudes10 
 
The Offender Population Framework 
The offender population structure is made up of three separate parts: pre-
punishment, prison, and probation (Figure 14). The pre-punishment sector consists of one 
stock and an inflow. The awaiting trial and sentencing stock represents the court delay 
between capture and sentencing. The inflow to awaiting trial has been created using 
assumptions detailed in Appendix 3.  All offenders enter the system through this stock. 
                                                 
10
 In these diagrams stocks and variables with double line borders feed into other modules of the model. Any 
variables serving as input from other modules have the module name before the variable name, for example: 
Probation.First Time Offender entry rate. 
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Movement to prison or probation is decided by the imprisonment fraction shown in the 
attitudes module. 
Offenders enter the prison sector via the prison entry rate and spend their sentence 
in the prison population stock (Figure 14). There are two ways of exiting the prison stock; 
being released unconditionally or entry into the serious offenders stock. Serious offenders 
serve longer sentences than other offenders. Once an offender has entered the released 
offender stock they have two paths. Reformed offenders enter the stock of reformed 
prisoners where they stay until they die. If an offender commits a further offence they re-
enter the awaiting trial and sentence stock. Probated prisoners face a similar ‘choice’ at the 
end of their sentence. 
 
Figure 14: Offender Population: Stock and Flow structure  
 
Serious and non serious offenders 
 The main feature of the prison population is the division between serious and less 
serious offenders (Figure 15). How many offenders enter the serious offender stock is 
dependent upon offence seriousness. Hedderman’s (2008) results indicate that violent 
crime has not risen, yet Carter (2007) claims that there has been a growth in the seriousness 
of offences. We reconcile these conflicting views to by assuming that the actual seriousness 
of offences has been stable, and recidivism has risen. It is because of the recidivism rise 
that crime has been viewed as more serious. 
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Figure 15: Prison population: Stock and Flow structure 
 Recidivism after release was assumed to be a function of the time it takes to detect 
recidivism, and the recidivism rate. The time to detect recidivism has been taken as being 
equal to the two year recidivism detection time used in the published prison statistics. 
Parole 
 When serious offenders are released it is under the conditions of a parole license. 
Parolees have a lower recidivism rate that other offenders (Ellis, 1998), so the numbers of 
offenders on parole needs to be tracked for use in the recidivism module. We track parole 
by using a co-flow. Paroled offenders parole license conditions last for a time proportionate 
to their original sentence. We have interpreted Ellis’s work to mean that the time spent on 
parole can be spent providing rehabilitative/resettlement help.  
 
Figure 16: Parole population: Stock and Flow structure 
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Probation 
The Probation Population structure is modeled simply, with a constant probation 
length of one year. Observation of probation length trends (Ministry of Justice, 2008) 
showed very little variance in the length of sentence, so we did not model this in detail. 
 
Figure 17: Probation population: Stock and Flow structure 
Recidivism 
The idea behind the structure shown in Figure 18 is that recidivism can be reduced 
through rehabilitation. The structure can be condensed into one equation:   
Offender rehabilitation completion*rehabilitation effectiveness*effect of capacity utilization 
=Recidivism Reduction 
The reasoning governing the equation is that rehabilitation programs take time to 
implement. If the average sentence length is shorter than the time required to complete a 
rehabilitation program, then only a fraction of offenders (if any) will complete a 
rehabilitation program. Long term offenders have the additional benefit of time on parole 
during which rehabilitation can continue.  
Next we assume that rehabilitation can produce a certain reduction in recidivism. We 
express this reduction as a fraction and multiply it by the fraction of offenders who 
complete rehabilitation programs. Once we have the potential recidivism reduction we need 
to know whether the capacity exists to deliver the full potential of the programs. To 
represent this we multiply the potential recidivism reduction by the effect of capacity 
utilization to give us the potential deliverable recidivism reduction.  
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Figure 18: Rehabilitation 
 The potential deliverable recidivism reduction is used to define the actual change to 
recidivism (Figure 19). The actual change to recidivism has been modeled as a stock, to 
account for the fact that changes to rehabilitation programs also take time. The value of the 
actual change to recidivism stock is then subtracted from the prisoner perception of the 
benefits of crime to give the variable: Prison Fractional Recidivism. 
 
 
Figure 19: Recidivism reduction 
35 
We ran capacity utilization through a delay to ensure that prisoner’s rehabilitation was 
being affected by the level of capacity utilization experienced whilst in prison (Figure 20). 
The structure in Figure 20 is also used to calculate the capacity utilizations effect on 
sentence lengths (first seen in Figure 12). 
 
Figure 20: Experienced Capacity Utilization 
 
 
Probation recidivism is calculated in a simpler fashion. Like prison recidivism, it is 
assumed that there is a baseline tendency to become a recidivist that is determined by the 
crime rate. The actual caseload experienced by the offender moderates the probation 
recidivism fraction through a non linear effect. 
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Figure 21: Probation recidivism 
The effect of worker to offender ratio on recidivism (Figure 22) has been based on 
media reports. The ‘normal’ caseload of a probation worker in London is 40 offenders per 
worker (Marin, 2009). A caseload of 40 officers means a ratio of workers to offenders of 
0.025. This value was used to normalize the function. The detrimental effects from 
caseloads over 100 have been modeled on a real life case from Lewisham in London 
(Marin, 2009) 
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Figure 22: Effect of Worker to Offender Ratio on Recidivism 
Prison Capacity Model  
The prison and the probation capacity structures are very similar as they are rooted in 
John Sterman’s (2000) inventory model. Figure 23 is the simplest stock and flow 
explanation of the prison system. Two stocks are used: Prisons Under Construction, and 
Prison Cells. Prison cells have to be ordered before construction can begin. It takes a 
prescribed amount of time for cells to be constructed. Once in service prison cells 
depreciate, according to their average lifetime. 
Prison Cells
Under Construction Prison Cellsconstruction rate depreciation rateorder rate
 
Figure 23: Simple Prison Capacity Structure 
The full structure (Figure 24) details how the order rate is decided upon. The 
indicated order rate aims to replace cells lost through depreciation, and to close the gap 
between the forecast number of prison cells and the forecast number of prisoners. Within 
the formulation of the indicated order rate provision is also made to allow for the cells 
which are currently under construction. 
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Figure 24: Full Stock and Flow Structure: Prison Capacity 
The prison population forecasts span for five years. Trends in population growth are 
used to make a five year forecast for the prison population: 
Population.PRISONER_TOTAL*(1+perceived_pop_growth_percentage/100)^5 
Trends in the growth of cells are also used to make a forecast of the number of cells 
that will be required in five years time: 
Prison_Cells*(1+perceived_cell_growth_percentage/100)^5 
The gap between these two forecasts is used to create the forecast number of cells 
that will be ordered. The final influence on the order rate is the percentage of the gap that is 
funded. As we have not explicitly modeled the economy we have simulated swings and 
shifts in economic performance and the political prioritization of the prison system with a 
10 year sinwave. 
Probation Capacity Model 
Probation capacity is measured in terms of probation workers. The probation 
capacity section consists of two stocks: Probation Staff and Trainees (Figure 25). There is a 
hiring rate for new trainees, a training rate, and a quitting rate.  
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Figure 25: Simple Stock and Flow Structure: Probation Capacity 
Aside from changes to names the probation capacity sector has only one change to 
the structure used in prison capacity structure. The average service length is a function of 
the staff caseload. The higher the caseload the shorter the average service length will be 
(Figure 26). 
 
Figure 26: The Effect of Probation Officer Caseload on Probation Officer Service Length 
 
Summary 
This chapter has presented the building of the model from the initial hypothesis to 
the causal loop diagrams which defined the problem dynamically. The final section has 
detailed the actual structure built and explained why how we have interpreted the 
information from our literature review. We will now go on to show the most important 
validation points for the model. 
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Analysis 
“The validation of a model is not that it is true but that it generates good testable 
hypotheses relevant to important problems.” Levins 1966 in Ford 
“It is better to be almost right, than completely wrong” John Maynard Keynes 
The goal of our model is to understand how real world structure is related to real 
world behavior. But the creation of model requires the reduction of the real world into a 
simplified understandable version of the real world. Each structure in the model has to be 
tested to ensure that it produces valid predictable behavior for any input. If the model can 
produce valid predictable behavior then we can have some confidence in it. If we have 
confidence in a model then we can begin to use it to improve understanding our of the real 
world. The virtual environment can become a testing ground for alternative strategies and 
behaviors that we wish to try out in the real world. 
In this section we summarize the tests carried out both during and after the model 
building process. The section will cover several of the tests designed to ensure that model 
variables at least produce the behavior predicted in the hypothesis section. The testing will 
be divided down into two main sections, the first covering direct structure tests, and the 
second containing structure orientated behavior tests.  
Direct Structure Test    
Direct structure testing involves direct comparison of the behavior and parameters of 
the model to knowledge and information about the real system. Much of the direct structure 
testing of the model occurred as an integral part of the writing of the earlier sections of this 
paper.  
The review of criminological literature on the subject of capacity utilization provided 
the basis for the model structure described in the hypothesis section. Each structure in the 
model has a basis in the literature: the structure of the prison population is based upon the 
concept of the bifurcation (Bottoms, 1983), the attitudes formed as a result of the crime 
level are based in Tim Newburn’s (2007) research, and the capacity sections are loosely 
based on Sterman’s (2000) supply chain models. Further checks on the structure of the 
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system were made through interviews with criminologists and the system dynamics team at 
the Ministry of Justice. Their contributions early in the development of the model have 
been invaluable in understanding which areas to could provide the most useful insights.  
The model parameters were based on an extensive examination of the database of 
information available from the Home Office and Ministry of Justice. Wherever possible, 
real data was used to provide benchmarks, and test hypothesized behavior of the model 
during the building process. Within this research one of the largest problems of tackling 
overcrowding was uncovered: data inconsistency. In all the datasets there is a clear proviso 
that the individual parts of data sets will not add up the totals. For example the total number 
of people entering a prison cannot be established by adding together the sum of the 
categories for entry into prison. Methods and types of data have also changed regularly 
during the last 20 years. In order to minimize the problems caused by data errors we have 
attempted to match the home office data with data sets compiled by other authors in the 
field. 
Structure orientated behavior tests 
Sterman (2000) recommends several different kinds of structure orientated behavior 
tests. In this paper we have concentrated on testing how the system reacts from an 
equilibrium state to shock population inputs. To test the validity of our hypothesis key 
loops were cut out of the system cutting feedback loops11. Details of extreme condition 
tests and sensitivity tests are contained in appendix 4.  
Equilibrium shock test 
The model was initialized in equilibrium12.  Applying a sudden shock of 1000 extra 
first offenders each year should cause prison capacity utilization to rise sharply, before 
falling rapidly to a value below 1. After this initial small disturbance capacity utilization 
will gradually rise to a higher peak, before slowly beginning to return to its equilibrium 
state.   
This behavior was observed in Figure 27.  
                                                 
11
 In this paper we do not detail the cutting of loops: R1, R4, R5, B4 or B5. The effects of these loops were 
found to be very closely related to the effects of other loops in the system – so in the interests of space they 
have been excluded from the text. 
12
 The attachments to this paper include a model designed with switches to set it in equilibrium, turn off 
model sectors, and apply shocks to the first offender flow, and the prisoner entry flows. 
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Figure 27: Response to a shock input 
The initial spike in capacity utilization is the systems immediate reaction to the sudden 
increase in inflow. Capacity utilization’s peak and fall occurs as capacity production 
increases to match the new population level. Population should also be reacting 
simultaneously to get back into equilibrium. During initial the period of increased capacity 
utilization, sentence lengths fall and recidivism rises. As recidivism rises, the judiciary 
imprisons a greater fraction of people, driving population upward.  All the time prison 
capacity is trying to catch up to a previous level of population. The next sections will cut 
out individual loops to see how they contribute to the equilibrium shock reaction. 
The Building Strategy Loop B1 
According to the Building Strategy Loop B1, the increase of capacity should be a 
delayed reaction to the growth in the prisoner population. The size of the difference 
between the two stocks should affect the slope of capacity utilization. If our hypothesis is 
correct the rise in capacity utilization should coincide with an initial oscillation in prisoner 
population. The two stocks should eventually come closer together before both settling at a 
higher equal level. This was reflected in the behavior in Figure 28. 
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Figure 28: Relationship between stock reactions and capacity utilization 
In order to see the effect of the Building Strategy Loop B1, we can cut the loops from 
the model. Cutting Loop B1 can be achieved by making the flows in and out of the stock of 
Prison Cells equal to the flows in and out of the Total Prisoner Population13. Cutting out 
loop B1 should put capacity utilization into a constant state of equilibrium, as the two 
stocks it is derived from now move in unison. This was observed in Figure 29.  
 
Figure 29: Cutting Loop B1 
                                                 
13
 Equalizing the outflows is complicated by the presence of two stocks for the prisoner total. The problem is 
remedied, by making the capacity Depreciation Rate equal to the total of the Less Serious Offender and 
Serious Offender flows. 
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We can conclude form this that the delay times in Loop B1 and the forecasting 
methods used are at the heart of capacity utilization problems. As long as loop B1 is active, 
capacity utilization problems will occur whenever the number of prisoners changes. As a 
small experiment we reduced the gap adjustment time to 1 year. Lowering the gap 
adjustment time should create a system more averse to capacity shortages. This behavior 
was observed in Figure 30.  
 
Figure 30: Behavior after reducing the gap adjustment time 
 
Sentencing Strategy Loop B2 
We hypothesized that high capacity utilization would shorten sentence lengths due to 
the Sentence Length Strategy Loop B2. We cut out loop B2 by setting the Capacity 
Utilization Effect on Sentence lengths to 1 to observe if this was true. The observations in 
Figure 31 support our hypothesis. 
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Figure 31: Sentence lengths with (1) and without (2) loop B2 
 
The shortening of sentence lengths should lead to a smoothing out of disturbances in 
capacity utilization, so the amplitude of the capacity utilization behavior should be greater 
without loop B2. This was observed in Figure 32.  
 
Figure 32: System behavior with (1) and without (2) Loop B2 
The level of oscillation in Figure 32 signifies that loop B2 is a strong lever in the 
control of capacity utilization. According to our hypothesis loop B2 acts to stabilize 
population levels. The more stable population is the more stable both capacity and capacity 
utilization will be. Without Loop B2 the oscillations in population, are worsened by the 
delay in constructing new cells.  
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Cutting the Rehabilitation Strategy Loop B3  
According to our hypothesis there are additional influences on sentence length 
operating through recidivism and rehabilitation. Recidivism is controlled by two loops: The 
Rehabilitation Strategy Loop B3 and the Punitive Focus Loop R2. We tested the effects of 
these loops by cutting off one loop at a time.  
Loop B3 was cut by setting the two completion ratios to their equilibrium values.  
Cutting here assumes that amount of rehabilitation successfully performed in prison is 
unaffected by sentence length changes. We predicted that cutting loop B3 would cause a 
drop in recidivism. With loop B3 active sentence lengths were allowed to fall below their 
equilibrium value. With lower sentences, the amount of rehabilitation that can take place 
was been limited. When we removed loop B3 the predicted drop in recidivism was 
observed (Figure 33).  
 
Figure 33: Recidivism with (1) and without (2) loop B3 
The effect on capacity utilization, of cutting loop B3, should be a lower amplitude but 
a longer duration of time spent with capacity shortages. This behavior was observed in 
Figure 34 - capacity utilization does not return to its equilibrium state until 2097 (beyond 
the scale of Figure 34). 
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Figure 34: Capacity Utilization with (1) and without (2) loop B3 
 
Cutting the Punitive Focus Loop R2.  
Next loop R2 was cut by making the values of the non linear table function, Capacity 
Utilization Effect on Rehabilitation Delivery equal 1. Cutting Loop R2 rehabilitation 
should allow rehabilitation to take place without concern for capacity constraints. As a 
result recidivism should be lower and sentence lengths will also be lower. Whilst 
recidivism was indeed lower (Figure 35), there was only a minimal impact on capacity 
utilization. The impact on capacity utilization was not any greater with a higher offender 
completion ratio. 
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Figure 35: Fractional recidivism with (1) and without (2) Loop R2 
 
Cutting the punish recidivism loop R4 
Recidivism usually increases the number of people going to prison. So with loop R4 
switched off the amplitude of capacity utilization problems should be less severe. Loop R4 
was cut by setting the imprisonment fraction to its equilibrium level of 0.27. Our predicted 
behavior was observed. Capacity utilization without loop R4 had a less aggressive reaction 
(Figure 36).  
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Figure 36: Capacity utilization with (1) and without (2) loop R4 
The capacity utilization behavior occurred because of the differences in the prisoner 
population behavior (Figure 37). 
 
Figure 37: Population comparison with (1) and without (2) loop R4 
The differences in population development were partially caused by changes to 
recidivism. 
50 
 
Figure 38: Prison fractional recidivism comparison with (1) and without (2) loop R4 
 
Cutting Loop B6 
The cut to Loop R4 also affects probation; as loop B6 is cut automatically. It was 
predicted that the probation system population would grow much slower if there were no 
changes to the imprisonment. This behavior was observed.  
 
Figure 39: Probation population with (1) and without (2) loop B6 
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Cutting Loop R7 
Cutting loop R7 the probation hiring strategy loop can achieved in the same manner 
as the cutting of loop B1. The in and outflows for the probation population were made the 
same as the in and out flows from probation multiplied by the desired worker offender 
ratio. The results from equalizing the probation capacity and population should have very 
interesting implications for prison capacity utilization. We believe that cutting loop R7 will 
cause prison capacity utilization to be much lower. This was observed in Figure 40.  
 
Figure 40: Comparison of prison capacity utilization with (1) and without (2) loop R7 
 
The logic behind this reduction in capacity utilization can be found by considering 
the imprisonment ratio. The equilibrium imprisonment rate is 0.27, meaning that 73% of 
offenders are headed towards probation. Reductions in probation fractional recidivism will 
therefore have a larger impact on the inflow to the prison system than reductions in prison 
recidivism. Removing the delay from loop R7 improves the worker to offender ratio, which 
reduces probation fractional recidivism (Figure 41).   
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Figure 41: Probation Fractional Recidivism with (1) and without (2) loop R7 
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Sensitivity analysis 
Building Delays 
In line with my hypothesis, cutting loop B1 showed that the model was potentially 
sensitive to changes in the delay times in the building module.  Sensitivity analysis was 
conducted on the construction time for prisons. Construction times of 1 year, 3 years and 5 
years were tried. The difference was very small indicating low sensitivity to building 
changes.  
 
Figure 42: Sensitivity to changes in construction time 
The same test was also run on the capacity adjustment time. The capacity adjustment 
time produced more dramatic differences. Most notably with an adjustment time of 1 year 
the system becomes unstable. Reducing the capacity adjustment time has the potential to 
reduce capacity utilization quickly, but the very speed of this reaction could cause 
difficulties of overcompensating and the building of excess cells.  
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Figure 43: Sensitivity analysis on Gap Adjustment time 
 
Rehabilitation schemes 
The model was tested for its sensitivity to the effectiveness of rehabilitation schemes. 
Sensitivity ran at intervals of 33.3%, from 0% effectiveness to 100% effectiveness. As 
expected, higher levels of effectiveness from rehabilitation reduce the levels of capacity 
utilization further. However in the long term the gain from 0% to 33.3% and from 33.3% to 
66.7% are far greater than those from 66.7% to 100% rehabilitative effectiveness. In the 
long term any increase in rehabilitation’s effectiveness does have benefits.  
 
 
Figure 44: Sensitivity analysis to changes in rehabilitation (0%, 33.3%, 66.7%, 100%) 
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If we assume 100% effectiveness from rehabilitation schemes and change the effect of 
capacity utilization to a flat value, we can see how sensitive the model is to this parameter. 
We ran sensitivity at values of 1, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, and 0.  The effect of capacity utilization 
had a visible effect on reducing capacity utilization.  
 
Figure 45: Sensitivity to different flat rates in capacity utilization effect on rehabilitation 
The results of this test suggest two alternatives: if rehabilitation can be delivered in a 
shorter time or if sentences can be lengthened; real gains can be made in capacity 
utilization control through improved rehabilitation. 
The probation workforce adjustment time 
As the majority of people are going through probation cutting recidivism in this area 
should produce significant reductions in the flow of recidivists into the prison system. It is 
possible that the effect on capacity utilization on from these gains will be greater than that 
from direct action in the prison system. 
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We ran a sensitivity analysis on a workforce adjustment time of 1year, 3 years and 5 years 
(Figure 46). The capacity utilization was sensitive to changing the adjustment time. Longer 
adjustment times led to shorter but more amplified reactions to the initial shock. 
 
Figure 46: Capacity Utilization sensitivity to changes in probation workforce adjustment time 
 
 
 
The Time to Change Recidivist Perception 
Changing the adjustment time for the recidivist perception should have a dramatic 
effect on capacity utilization. The longer reaction times are the longer the duration of 
disturbances to capacity utilization and the lower the aggressiveness of the capacity 
utilization reaction. The changes in capacity utilization are rooted in the changes caused to 
sentence lengths, offence seriousness and the imprisonment fraction. All three of these 
variables should be smoothed by a longer adjustment time. 
The behavior predicted in capacity utilization was observed in the equilibrium shock 
test. 
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Figure 47: Capacity Utilization reaction to changes in perception of recidivism adjustment time 
 
Testing table functions 
The next section goes through the table functions used in this paper and provides 
justification for the influence of these functions. The curve of a table function reflects a 
parameter assumption that needs to be tested like any other assumption. We detail the tests 
undertaken on three table functions: the effect of political punitiveness, the effect of the 
recidivist fraction on the judiciary, and prisoner perceptions of the benefits of crime. 
Wherever a selection of curves is presented the final curve in the sequence is always the 
one used in the model. 
 
Effect of political punitiveness 
  
Three different policy curves were tried for the effect of political punitiveness (Figure 
48). No significant difference to the development of capacity utilization or the prisoner 
population was observed by changing the policy curve. The third curve was used in the 
model. It was felt to accurately reflect the limits of leniency and harshness within which 
politicians must reside. In the current model this table function provides the only avenue 
for politicians to exercise restraint in legislation. It was felt that the restraints on political 
punitiveness could be adequately explained by this curve. However a future exploration of 
the structures limiting political punitiveness would be an interesting future model task14.  
                                                 
14
 Any such analysis should include seasonal economic constraints, as well as using capacity utilization as a 
measure of humanitarian constraints on the growth of political punitiveness. 
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Figure 48: Different policy curves for the effect of political punitiveness on sentencing 
The effect of the recidivist fraction on the judiciary 
The effect of the recidivist fraction on the judiciary has a significant effect on 
sentence lengths and recidivism; however it had only a minimal impact on the actual 
behavior of capacity utilization and population. Three different curves were tested (Figure 
49). The third curve was used in the model. The table function used in the model was 
settled upon using Stephenson’s (1999) description of the behavior of the judiciary. The 
curve represents the conservative nature of the judiciary, less inclined to rapid changes in 
punitiveness. The thresholds for the effect on judicial punitiveness were also set quite 
narrowly, representing the limits imposed by legislation on judicial decision making. If any 
further harshening were to take place it would have to come directly from the legislation. 
Similar reasoning was used to choose all three curves relating to the influence of recidivism 
on judicial sentencing 
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Figure 49: Different policy curves for the effect of recidivist fraction on the judiciary 
 
Prisoner perception of the benefits of crime 
Changing the shape of the curve for the perceptions of crime was found not to alter 
the behavior of the system. We used the third curve the steep incline followed a slower 
more gradual rise is indicative of a situation where more crime equates to more  benefit, but 
the increase in benefit from crime diminished as more crime is committed in society(Figure 
50). 
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Figure 50: Different policy curves for prisoner perception of the benefits of crime 
 
Capacity utilization effect on sentence 
Changing the curve of the capacity effect on sentence length can significantly alter the 
amplitude of the capacity utilization behavior. The current curve was chosen as it appears 
to be the best fit to the use of early release programs since 1990. Alternate curves could 
provide a good guideline for establishing clear policy on how early release schemes would 
be used in future. Having an agreed upon plan in place may make the use of early release 
use slightly less controversial. 
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Integration method and Choice of DT 
A DT set to 0.025 provided stable results. 
The oscillatory nature of overcrowding suggested using Runge Kutta integration, 
however as some logical functions are used in the model Eulers integration method was 
used.  
Recreating the reference mode 
In this section the model was initialized with historic data wherever possible. Where 
data was not available estimates of historic values were used.  Using historic estimates 
allows comparison between the behavior of the variables of interest the historic behavior. 
According to the criterion in Theil’s hypothesis we can judge the fit to the reference 
mode on three criteria: bias, variation and co-variation. Little bias was found in the model 
(Figure 51). The historic and modeled behaviors were found to have a similar mean value. 
The historic and modeled behaviors were found to co-vary very well, a point to point 
correlation was found between the majority of variances. There were some issues with 
matching the amplitude of variations. The differences in amplitude variation were not 
thought to be of significant harm to the validity of the model. 
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Figure 51: Historic (1) and modeled (2) UK capacity utilization 
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Comparison of historic and modeled population and capacity behavior 
The problems with our data fit became more easily understandable when we examined 
population and capacity separately. The trend in population development was similar to the 
historic trend however an initialization problem was apparent in the 1988 to 1992 period 
and there is a clear issue reproducing the population growth around 1997 (Figure 52). 
Sensitivity analysis indicated that the initialization problem is related to the perception of 
recidivism (appendix 5). The length of the perception of recidivism adjustment time was 
found to affect the initial fit. 
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Figure 52: Historic (1) and modeled (2) population development 
The fit to the 1997 period is a problem which we have faced in every version of our 
model. It occurs in the reproduction of both population and capacity (Figure 53). 
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Figure 53: Historic (1) and modeled (2) capacity development 
 
What is apparent from seeing these two graphs is that in the development of capacity 
is a smoothed version of the historic trend in population development (Figure 54).  
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Figure 54: Reference mode reproduction 
Though our population development does not completely track the amplitude of the 
movements in the historic trend we feel that the reference mode behavior achieved in the 
model is sufficient to assume that there is some validity in the assumptions of the model. A 
model that produces partial results can in fact be more useful than a model that exactly 
reproduces the reference mode. The ultimate concern of this model is that capacity and 
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population react together. Though the current model is far from a complete picture of the 
prison system we can still draw useful insights from the model which may be hidden in the 
real world due to the complexity of the system.  
 
Reference Mode Sensitivity to changes in the perception of public, and political adjustment 
times 
In our hypothesis section we converted Newburn’s (2007) hypothesis that 
incarceration rates reflected a delayed perception of the crime rate to a modeled structure. 
Due to the method chosen to shock the system we realized that the effect of changes to the 
public and political perception adjustment times could not be observed. 
To understand how public and political adjustment times affected the model 
behavior we ran the model from its historic values to test how sensitive the system was to 
changes in these adjustment times15. The results were a partial match to the evidence in the 
literature and guided our choice of parameter values. We predicted that the system would 
be most sensitive to changes in the time to perceive changes in crime. Changes in the time 
to perceive changes in crime will have a double effect: changes to public punitiveness will 
alter sentence lengths and changes to offender perceptions of crime will reduce recidivism. 
The predicted behavior in capacity utilization was observed (Figure 55).  
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Figure 55: Capacity utilization sensitivity to changes in the time to perceive changes to the crime rate 
                                                 
15
 Brief tests were also run to test the equilibrium reaction to a shock in the crime rate. These are not detailed 
in the paper as it was felt that the sensitivity in reference mode replication provided sufficient information.  
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There was a more subtle but significant reaction to changes in the time to change 
public punitiveness. The results indicated that the longer the time to change public 
punitiveness, the less volatile the resulting capacity utilization behavior (Figure 56). 
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Figure 56: Capacity Utilization sensitivity to time to change public punitiveness. 
Capacity Utilization was less sensitive to changes in the political punitiveness 
adjustment time.  
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Policy   
The policy tests in this paper fell into two groups: policies aimed directly altering 
prison capacity, policies aimed at directly or indirectly controlling the population. In both 
cases it must be remembered that these are policies must fall under the control of the 
National Offender Management Service – which excludes direct control of variables such 
as the crime rate, inflow of first time offenders and sentence lengths. The three policies 
tested16 were the quick build strategy, improving rehabilitation, and custody extra. 
Policy Option 1: The Quick Build Policy 
Our literature review, hypothesis and analysis all point to the building loop B1 
(Figure 5) as a key factor in the control of capacity utilization. Policy 1 or “the quick build 
strategy” is an extension of a study done in 2005 by Bourne. We have followed the data in 
Bourne’s (2005) paper to add a policy to build units that have shorter construction times 
than specially designed prison units. The policy comes into effect whenever capacity 
utilization is high.  
Policy Option 2: Improving Rehabilitation Policy 
Capacity utilization problems can also be addressed by looking at the input of 
offenders. The editor of the prisons Handbook recently commented the “targeting 
reoffending has got to be the cornerstone of the prison service. If a hospital discharged 
patients and 67% came back with the same illness we’d close down the hospital”(Leech, 
2010). In our literature review and hypothesis sections we laid out the argument that 
recidivism was one of the major causes of the acceleration in the prison population that is 
part of the reason for our current capacity utilization problems. The first policy we will try 
in this area (Policy 2) is to increase the effectiveness of rehabilitation.17 
Policy Option 3: Custody Extra 
Policy 3 is an extension of a combination policy that is currently being tried in areas 
on England. Our policy is called “Custody extra”.  Offenders serve their sentences part 
                                                 
16
 An additional policy, the “state of emergency policy” was also tested  and is detailed in appendix 6 
17
 The next step would be to cost all of this policy and give a cost effectiveness analysis to see what the costs 
would be to make such a reduction in recidivism. There have in fact been recent calls for exactly this to be 
done. 
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time but over a much longer period. For example they spend half of the week in prison but 
are allowed to be monitored at home for the other days. They are able to continue working 
etc under this type of scheme, and more importantly to maintain family ties. As their 
sentences stretch for longer they are more likely to finish rehabilitation schemes. 
Analysis of  the Quick Build Policy 
We have interpreted the Quick Build policy by adding a new structure (Figure 57).  
 
Figure 57: Quick build policy structure 
A second outflow called the Quick Build Units Construction Rate (QBUC) is added 
to the prison cells under construction stock.  Capacity utilization is run through a delay to 
allow it to be reported. Once capacity utilization exceeds the value of one the QBUC rate 
kicks in. The QBUC rate has a shorter construction time than the ordinary construction rate, 
so should allow faster compensation for capacity problems.  
The effect of Capacity Utilization on Construction converts a maximum of 10% of 
all normal construction to Quick Build units. The effect begins whenever capacity 
utilization exceeds 1. As capacity utilization worsens the proportion increases (Figure 58). 
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Figure 58: Effect of capacity utilization on construction 
Quick build cells have a lifetime of 30 years rather than the 60 years (Bourne, 2005). 
We also feel that the adjustment to the lifetime of prison capacity could at least partially 
represent the extra strain put on the existing infrastructure – ie plumbing, heating etc of the 
existing blocks. The pricing implications of these types of cells have been evaluated, and 
they have proven to be competitive (Bourne, 2005).18 
Analysis of Improving Rehabilitation Policy 
 Improving rehabilitation was made through parameter adjustment in the year 2008.  
Analysis of the Custody Extra Policy 
We have built an extra co-flow structure in the model to describe Custody Extra. 
We treated the policy as if every less serious prisoner was required to serve parole19. Whilst 
this is not an exact recreation of part time sentencing it does provide an indication of the 
effect. 
 
                                                 
18
 The quick build structure could be further improved by taking into account real life planning issues. How 
would funding be allocated? Would the change of capacity type really mean that less normal capacity would 
be built or would quick build capacity be built in addition to the existing planned normal capacity? 
19
 This structure can again only give a rough estimate of the impact of the policy. In reality the increases to 
the probation population would happen during an inmate’s sentence. The current solution has been used to 
explore the idea, with the ultimate plan of upgrading the structure to track offenders simultaneously serving 
half their time in prison and half on probation. 
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Figure 59: Policy structure: Custody Extra 
 We have also tied the scheme to electronic tagging. Use of tagging can reduce the 
strain on probation officers who are able to deal with more offenders. We have simulated 
this by lowering the normal offender ratio. This should allow the larger number of 
offenders being supervised under custody extra to be dealt without damaging the worker to 
offender ratio. 
Policy testing 
We have tested our policies in two ways: (1) equilibrium to understand how the 
policies are working, and (2) scenario testing to see how the policies might work in practice. 
In the equilibrium tests the system was initialized in equilibrium and subjected to a shock 
input of prisoners as in earlier tests. In 2008 we will introduce each new policy to see how 
the system is affected. Scenario testing used historical parameter settings and three 
different projections of population and crime rate developments. 
The Quick Build Policy Equilibrium Shock Test 
When tested the new policy brings down capacity utilization much more quickly 
than under normal conditions (Figure 60). The policy however overcompensates leaving 
the system operating with spare capacity for a number of years (until 2077). Running with 
extra capacity is in the long term good for the system as it allows growth in population to 
be absorbed; however there are additional costs involved in maintaining the empty cells. 
The maintenance cost of over capacity vs under capacity would be a very useful topic for 
future research. 
70 
 
Figure 60: Equilibrium shock test before (1) and after the quick build policy (2) 
 The extra capacity added also has the side effect of increasing prisoner numbers 
(Figure 61). Whilst the prisoner number increase does not appear to have an adverse effect 
on capacity utilization it will have other cost implications for the prison system. 
 
Figure 61: Prisoner population development without (1) and with quick build policy (2) 
The prisoner number increase is due to a rise in sentence lengths as the need for 
early release policies are less necessary. Whilst this does increase the population (more 
people for longer) it also reduces the rate of recidivism, a major contributor to population 
growth.  
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This policy is sensitive to changes in both in the range and the shape of the policy 
curve. The steeper the initial slope of the curve the more pronounced the behavior it 
produces. 
Improved Rehabilitation Policy Equilibrium Shock Test 
 Doubling the normal effectiveness of rehabilitation to 0.4 has a significant impact 
on capacity utilization (Figure 62). However practical questions would need to be asked 
about how rehabilitation could be improved by this amount. 
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Figure 62: Equilibrium Shock Test: Rehabilitation Effectiveness 
Custody Extra Policy Equilibrium Shock Test 
Despite the extending time available for rehabilitation and improving probation 
provision Custody Extra does very little in the equilibrium test (Figure 63). There is a small 
oscillation at the onset of the policy and a tiny reduction in capacity utilization. We believe 
this is because short sentence lengths with custody extra are still less than that required for 
completion of a rehabilitation program. 
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Figure 63: Equilibrium Shock Test: Custody Extra  
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Scenario Tests 
The next set of testing is conducted with historical parameters. As we do not have 
predicted crime rates or population for the next 18 years we have created three possible 
futures (Figure 64). The national population has been set to increase along its current trend 
and in each potential future the crime rate becomes progressively worse. The worsening 
crime rate will change the population. In Scenario 1 there will be a slow decline in the 
prison population. Scenario 2 will have a slow growth in the prison population. Scenario 3 
will have a growth rate faster than our present condition. 
 
Figure 64: Future prison population scenarios. 
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Quick Build Policy: Scenario Tests 
The quick build policy operated well under both a slow (scenario 2) and a fast 
(scenario 3) growth rate. In the declining population scenario (scenario 3) the policy 
successfully brought down capacity utilization, but even a slight decline in the prisoner 
population the system will resulted in excess capacity.  
 
 
 
Figure 65: Quick Build policy under 3 different scenarios 
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Improved Rehabilitation Policy: Scenario tests 
The parameter induced rehabilitation policy produces the most dramatic results. 
Drop in demand from slowing the inflow of recidivists is very effective in reducing 
population and capacity utilization. It does however lead to excess capacity in the declining 
population scenario.  
 
 
Figure 66: Improved rehabilitation policy under three different scenarios 
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Custody Extra: Scenario tests 
Custody Extra performs well under all three scenarios. Custody Extra needs to be 
combined with a capacity expanding policy in scenario 3. At least part of the performance 
weakness seen in scenario 3 is due to the short sentence times spent in prison by offenders 
in a overcrowded prisons. Even though the sentence time is essentially doubled by the 
policy it is still not enough to complete a full rehabilitation program. 
 
 
Figure 67: Custody Extra under three different scenarios 
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Other potential policies 
Another set of potential policies exist through altering the adjustment times for the 
public perceptions of crime, and political punitiveness. The test on this set of policies has 
been documented in appendix 7 contrary to our hypothesis the effect on capacity utilization 
behavior proved to be minimal. The testing in this area showed one large problem with 
trying to control capacity utilization through adjustment times: the affect diminishes after 
1998 (Figure 55 and Figure 56), due to the shape of the crime rate curve. Unless there is a 
longer term reduction to the crime rate, the public perception of the crime rate should be 
high. The only way to bring the perception of the crime rate down would to give the public 
a much longer adjustment time, or to actually reduce crime for a longer period than has 
been achieved.  
 A final potential policy which could be considered is try and influence exactly what 
the public is measuring when developing punitiveness. The use of publicity regarding local 
level recidivism reductions in probation based penalties could reduce the public 
punitiveness. The perception of how well the prison system is performing in terms of 
recidivism would be an area where the National Offender Management Service has some 
influence and therefore a better potential candidate for prescribing penal policy. 
 
Conclusions from policy testing 
 
The policies used by NOMS in tackling overcrowding have to be robust under all 
future scenarios. The prison system must cope with an unpredictable input - that can both 
rise and fall each year. Under all policies there are problems with excess capacity in 
scenario 1. In scenario 1 the reduced growth in prison population and the delay in 
correcting prison capacity (due to the long lifetime of prison capacity) results in excess 
capacity. All the policies performed well under scenario 2. The quick build and 
rehabilitation policies showed the better results than Custody Extra in scenario 3. 
 If the judgment of these strategies is on which can keep the prison system running at 
as close to optimal capacity without causing excess capacity provision the quick build and 
custody extra plans both do well. The quick build policy has perhaps the best all around 
results and would therefore be our recommendation. 
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If excess capacity is not a problem then the rehabilitation strategy is by far the best 
performer. Understanding whether excess capacity truly is a problem requires an 
understanding of what the real costs are of running extra capacity and rehabilitation 
improvements. Our final recommendation is a additional study to this study: adding a cost 
effectiveness analysis. Such an analysis would allow us to measure and compare the long 
term costs of running with different capacity levels. Interesting questions about the relative 
costs and benefits of each of the policy methods could be more effectively judged. 
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Conclusion 
 
From our research, the modeling process and the validation of our model we have 
gained insights into the levers controlling prison overcrowding. From our research we have 
developed policies designed to address the three most important factors in overcrowding 
development: the demand for punitiveness, capacity control, and population control 
through recidivism. 
The model provided an insight into how Tim Newburn’s (2007) hypothesis could be 
applied, but the results from our initial policy investigations (appendix 7) indicated that 
there are still developments to be made in modeling this area. So despite the fact that 
changing the delay times can affect capacity utilization we have opted not to form policy in 
this area. Instead we recommend a renewed focus on the area of the generation of 
punitiveness and its effect on public policy development. 
Reducing the building delay was found to have a strong role in controlling capacity 
utilization. However its effects were not straight forward. In our hypothesis and analysis we 
demonstrated how the provision of excess capacity could impact on prison sentence lengths 
– in effect ratcheting up the prison population. Increased attention to rehabilitation 
provided the best method of reducing the prison population in the long term. This too could 
cause problems of excess capacity. We felt that the costs of high population vs excess 
capacity need to be evaluated by conducting a cost effectiveness analysis.  
The rehabilitation policy also raised the question of how improvements to 
rehabilitation can actually be achieved. Our final policy “custody extra” was an attempt to 
answer questions of how to deliver increased rehabilitation. Custody Extra was aimed to 
create a system with sentence lengths long enough to deliver more rehabilitation training 
than at present. As an initial policy it was promising but ultimately in the face of sharp 
increases in the prison population it could not deliver the results seen in policy based on 
reducing the building delay. 
Our paper has provided some insights into how the different parties involved in the 
prison system are affected by the events within the system. The policies developed have 
also shown that there are multiple methods of improving capacity utilization. Ultimately 
the questions of which policies are best should be evaluated in a future study concentrating 
on the cost effectiveness of policy, and the nature of the structure of public and political 
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interactions with the prison system. We feel that this paper provides a valuable basis for the 
development of work in these two areas.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Equations 
This model was designed in ithink using modules. The modules used were: 
Attitudes, Population, CAPACITY: Prison, CAPACITY: Probation, Recidivism. 
 
Attitudes: 
Judicial_Punitiveness(t) = Judicial_Punitiveness(t - dt) + (Change_to_judicial_punitiveness) * dt 
INIT Judicial_Punitiveness = .36*(1-Equilibrium_Switch)+.27*Equilibrium_Switch 
INFLOWS: 
Change_to_judicial_punitiveness = (Effect_of_recidivist_fraction_on_judiciary-
Judicial_Punitiveness)/Time_to_change_judicial_punitiveness 
Perception_of_crime_rate(t) = Perception_of_crime_rate(t - dt) + (Change_to_crime__rate_perception) * dt 
INIT Perception_of_crime_rate = .065*(1-Equilibrium_Switch)+.05*Equilibrium_Switch 
INFLOWS: 
Change_to_crime__rate_perception = (CRIMES_PER_PERSON-
Perception_of_crime_rate)/time_to_percieve_changes_in_crime 
PERCIEVED_RECIDIVIST_FRACTION(t) = PERCIEVED_RECIDIVIST_FRACTION(t - dt) + 
(change_to_recidivist_perception) * dt 
INIT PERCIEVED_RECIDIVIST_FRACTION = .6*(1-Equilibrium_Switch)+.5*Equilibrium_Switch 
INFLOWS: 
change_to_recidivist_perception = (Punishment_System__recidivism_fraction-
PERCIEVED_RECIDIVIST_FRACTION)/time_to_change_recidivist_perception 
Political_Punitiveness(t) = Political_Punitiveness(t - dt) + (Change_to_political_punitiveness) * dt 
INIT Political_Punitiveness = Public_Punitiveness 
INFLOWS: 
Change_to_political_punitiveness = (Public_Punitiveness-
Political_Punitiveness)/time_to_change_political_punitiveness 
Public_Punitiveness(t) = Public_Punitiveness(t - dt) + (Change_to_public_punitiveness) * dt 
INIT Public_Punitiveness = Perception_of_crime_rate 
INFLOWS: 
Change_to_public_punitiveness = (Perception_of_crime_rate-
Public_Punitiveness)/Time_to_change_public_punitiveness 
Adjusted_Extra_Statutory_Sentence = 
Recidivism.CAPACITY_UTILIZATION_EFFECT_ON_SENTENCE*Avge_Extra_Sentence 
Adjusted_Statutory_Short_Sentence = 
Recidivism.CAPACITY_UTILIZATION_EFFECT_ON_SENTENCE*Average_Short_Sentence 
Average_Short_Sentence = 
MAX(0.1,Effect_of_political_punitiveness_on_sentencing*Normal_Statutory_Short_Sentence) 
Avge_Extra_Sentence = 
MAX(0.1,Effect_of_political_punitiveness_on_sentencing*Normal_Statutory_Extra_Sentence) 
CRIMES_PER_PERSON = the_future*(1-
Equilibrium_Switch)+Equillibrium_Crimes_Per_Person*Equilibrium_Switch 
Crime_perception_time = 3 
Equilibrium_switch = .Equilibrium_master_switch 
Equillibrium_Crimes_Per_Person = .05 
ExtraSentence = Adjusted_Extra_Statutory_Sentence*effect_of_recidivist_fraction_on_sentence 
IMPRISONMENT_FRACTION = Judicial_Punitiveness 
LongSentence = ExtraSentence+ShortSentence 
Normal_perception_of_crime_rate = .05 
Normal_political_punitiveness = .05 
Normal_recidivist_fraction = .5 
Normal_Statutory_Extra_Sentence = 1.2*(1-Equilibrium_Switch)+.55*Equilibrium_Switch 
Normal_Statutory_Short_Sentence = .35*(1-Equilibrium_Switch)+.25*Equilibrium_Switch 
offence_seriousness = effect_of_recid_on_Offence_Seriousness 
Publicity_change = 5 
Publicity_Policy = 0 
Punishment_System__recidivism_fraction = 
(Population.prison_recidivism_rate*Weight_attached_to_prison_recidivism+Population.Probation_recid_rat
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e)/(Population.First_Time_Offender_entry_rate+Population.Probation_recid_rate+(Population.prison_recidiv
ism_rate*Weight_attached_to_prison_recidivism)) 
scenario = 1 
ShortSentence = Adjusted_Statutory_Short_Sentence*effect_of_recidivist_fraction_on_sentence 
the_future = 
IF(scenario=1)THEN(nice_future_CRIMES_PER_PERSON_1)ELSE(IF(scenario=2)THEN(OK_future_CRI
MES_PER_PERSON_2)ELSE(horrible_future_CRIMES_PER_PERSON_3)) 
Time_to_change_judicial_punitiveness = 2 
time_to_change_political_punitiveness = 2 
Time_to_change_public_punitiveness = 2 
time_to_change_recidivist_perception = 3 
time_to_percieve_changes_in_crime = 
If(Publicity_Policy=1)then(If(time>2007.5)then(Publicity_change)else(Crime_perception_time))else(Crime_
perception_time) 
Weight_attached_to_prison_recidivism = 1 
Effect_of_political_punitiveness_on_sentencing = 
GRAPH(Political_Punitiveness/Normal_political_punitiveness) 
(0.00, 0.39), (0.5, 0.39), (1.00, 1.00), (1.50, 1.24), (2.00, 1.44), (2.50, 1.61), (3.00, 1.70), (3.50, 1.76), (4.00, 
1.76) 
Effect_of_recidivist_fraction_on_judiciary = 
GRAPH(PERCIEVED_RECIDIVIST_FRACTION/Normal_recidivist_fraction) 
(0.7, 0.18), (0.8, 0.195), (0.9, 0.223), (1, 0.27), (1.10, 0.365), (1.20, 0.392), (1.30, 0.4), (1.40, 0.4), (1.50, 
0.4), (1.60, 0.4), (1.70, 0.4), (1.80, 0.4), (1.90, 0.4), (2.00, 0.4) 
effect_of_recidivist_fraction_on_sentence = 
GRAPH(PERCIEVED_RECIDIVIST_FRACTION/Normal_recidivist_fraction) 
(0.6, 0.88), (0.7, 0.88), (0.8, 0.88), (0.9, 0.92), (1, 1.00), (1.10, 1.12), (1.20, 1.30), (1.30, 1.57), (1.40, 1.74), 
(1.50, 1.86), (1.60, 1.91), (1.70, 1.94), (1.80, 1.94), (1.90, 1.96), (2.00, 1.96) 
effect_of_recid_on_Offence_Seriousness = 
GRAPH(PERCIEVED_RECIDIVIST_FRACTION/Normal_recidivist_fraction) 
(0.7, 0.18), (0.8, 0.195), (0.9, 0.223), (1, 0.27), (1.10, 0.365), (1.20, 0.413), (1.30, 0.435), (1.40, 0.448), 
(1.50, 0.463), (1.60, 0.463), (1.70, 0.465), (1.80, 0.468), (1.90, 0.468), (2.00, 0.468) 
horrible_future_CRIMES_PER_PERSON_3 = GRAPH(time) 
(1988, 0.078), (1989, 0.074), (1990, 0.077), (1991, 0.09), (1992, 0.104), (1993, 0.109), (1994, 0.108), (1995, 
0.102), (1996, 0.099), (1997, 0.097), (1998, 0.088), (1999, 0.087), (2000, 0.098), (2001, 0.101), (2002, 
0.098), (2003, 0.104), (2004, 0.113), (2005, 0.113), (2006, 0.105), (2007, 0.103), (2008, 0.1), (2009, 0.091), 
(2010, 0.122), (2011, 0.12), (2012, 0.11), (2013, 0.129), (2014, 0.148), (2015, 0.155), (2016, 0.146), (2017, 
0.122), (2018, 0.124), (2019, 0.129), (2020, 0.142), (2021, 0.152), (2022, 0.178), (2023, 0.193), (2024, 
0.191), (2025, 0.136), (2026, 0.13), (2027, 0.173), (2028, 0.178) 
nice_future_CRIMES_PER_PERSON_1 = GRAPH(time) 
(1988, 0.078), (1989, 0.074), (1990, 0.077), (1991, 0.09), (1992, 0.104), (1993, 0.109), (1994, 0.108), (1995, 
0.102), (1996, 0.099), (1997, 0.097), (1998, 0.088), (1999, 0.087), (2000, 0.098), (2001, 0.101), (2002, 
0.098), (2003, 0.104), (2004, 0.113), (2005, 0.113), (2006, 0.105), (2007, 0.103), (2008, 0.1), (2009, 0.091), 
(2010, 0.088), (2011, 0.095), (2012, 0.092), (2013, 0.0885), (2014, 0.08), (2015, 0.0755), (2016, 0.076), 
(2017, 0.077), (2018, 0.0835), (2019, 0.0895), (2020, 0.095), (2021, 0.095), (2022, 0.0915), (2023, 0.0875), 
(2024, 0.087), (2025, 0.092), (2026, 0.0885), (2027, 0.0815), (2028, 0.0855) 
OK_future_CRIMES_PER_PERSON_2 = GRAPH(time) 
(1988, 0.078), (1989, 0.074), (1990, 0.077), (1991, 0.09), (1992, 0.104), (1993, 0.109), (1994, 0.108), (1995, 
0.102), (1996, 0.099), (1997, 0.097), (1998, 0.088), (1999, 0.087), (2000, 0.098), (2001, 0.101), (2002, 
0.098), (2003, 0.104), (2004, 0.113), (2005, 0.113), (2006, 0.105), (2007, 0.103), (2008, 0.1), (2009, 0.091), 
(2010, 0.088), (2011, 0.095), (2012, 0.095), (2013, 0.093), (2014, 0.0895), (2015, 0.089), (2016, 0.096), 
(2017, 0.111), (2018, 0.111), (2019, 0.103), (2020, 0.0965), (2021, 0.0975), (2022, 0.106), (2023, 0.111), 
(2024, 0.113), (2025, 0.115), (2026, 0.107), (2027, 0.106), (2028, 0.109) 
Prisoner_perception_of_the_benefits_of_crime = 
GRAPH((Perception_of_crime_rate/Normal_perception_of_crime_rate)) 
(0.00, 0.00), (0.25, 0.075), (0.5, 0.205), (0.75, 0.41), (1.00, 0.56), (1.25, 0.68), (1.50, 0.735), (1.75, 0.775), 
(2.00, 0.79), (2.25, 0.81), (2.50, 0.82), (2.75, 0.82), (3.00, 0.82) 
Probatee_perception_of_the_benefits_of_crime = 
GRAPH((Perception_of_crime_rate/Normal_perception_of_crime_rate)) 
(0.00, 0.485), (0.25, 0.485), (0.5, 0.49), (0.75, 0.5), (1.00, 0.5), (1.25, 0.505), (1.50, 0.535), (1.75, 0.585), 
(2.00, 0.62), (2.25, 0.65), (2.50, 0.67), (2.75, 0.69), (3.00, 0.69) 
Reference_CRIMES_PER_PERSON = GRAPH(time) 
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(1988, 0.078), (1989, 0.074), (1990, 0.077), (1991, 0.09), (1992, 0.104), (1993, 0.109), (1994, 0.108), (1995, 
0.102), (1996, 0.099), (1997, 0.097), (1998, 0.088), (1999, 0.087), (2000, 0.098), (2001, 0.101), (2002, 
0.098), (2003, 0.104), (2004, 0.113), (2005, 0.113), (2006, 0.105), (2007, 0.103), (2008, 0.1), (2009, 0.091) 
 
CAPACITY: 
Equilibrium_switch = .Equilibrium_master_switch 
 
CAPACITY.Prison: 
Prison_Cells(t) = Prison_Cells(t - dt) + (construction_rate - depreciation_rate) * dt 
INIT Prison_Cells = Population.PRISONER_TOTAL*Initial_capacity_gap/desired_capacity_utilization*(1-
CAPACITY.Equilibrium_switch)+Population.PRISONER_TOTAL/desired_capacity_utilization*CAPACIT
Y.Equilibrium_switch 
INFLOWS: 
construction_rate = 
IF(Quick_build_policy=0)THEN(Prison_Cells_Under_Construction/construction_time)ELSE(Prison_Cells_
Under_Construction*(1-Effect_of_cap_util_on_construction)/construction_time) 
OUTFLOWS: 
depreciation_rate = Prison_Cells/average__life_of_cell 
Prison_Cells_Under_Construction(t) = Prison_Cells_Under_Construction(t - dt) + (order_rate - 
construction_rate - Quick_build_units_construction_rate) * dt 
INIT Prison_Cells_Under_Construction = depreciation_rate*construction_time 
INFLOWS: 
order_rate = indicated_orders*pct_of_gap_funded 
OUTFLOWS: 
construction_rate = 
IF(Quick_build_policy=0)THEN(Prison_Cells_Under_Construction/construction_time)ELSE(Prison_Cells_
Under_Construction*(1-Effect_of_cap_util_on_construction)/construction_time) 
Quick_build_units_construction_rate = 
Prison_Cells_Under_Construction*Effect_of_cap_util_on_construction/Quick_build_construction_time 
quick_build_cells(t) = quick_build_cells(t - dt) + (Quick_build_units_construction_rate - 
Quick_Build_Depreciation_rate) * dt 
INIT quick_build_cells = 0 
INFLOWS: 
Quick_build_units_construction_rate = 
Prison_Cells_Under_Construction*Effect_of_cap_util_on_construction/Quick_build_construction_time 
OUTFLOWS: 
Quick_Build_Depreciation_rate = quick_build_cells/Quick_Build_Capacity_Lifetime 
reported_capacity_utilization(t) = reported_capacity_utilization(t - dt) + 
(change_to_reported_capacity_utilization) * dt 
INIT reported_capacity_utilization = 1 
INFLOWS: 
change_to_reported_capacity_utilization = (CAPACITY_UTILIZATION-
reported_capacity_utilization)/time_to_change 
Adjst_decision = If(cell_gap_adj_connector>1.03)then(4)else(5) 
adjustment_for_cells_under_construction = (desired_prison_cells_under_construction-
Prison_Cells_Under_Construction)/construction_gap_adjustment_time 
average__life_of_cell = 60 
Capacity_connector = IF(time>2007.5)then(Quick_build_policy*reported_capacity_utilization)else(0) 
CAPACITY_UTILIZATION = Population.PRISONER_TOTAL/PRISON_CAPACITY 
cells_gap_adj_time = if(State_of_emergency=0)then(5)else(Adjst_decision) 
cell_gap_adj_connector = IF(time>2007.5)then(State_of_emergency*reported_capacity_utilization)else(0) 
construction_gap_adjustment_time = 5 
construction_time = 5 
construction_time_weighted_average = construction_time*(1-
Effect_of_cap_util_on_construction)+Quick_build_construction_time*Effect_of_cap_util_on_construction 
desired_capacity_utilization = 1.00 
Desired_Cell_order_rate = desired_replacement_rate+prison_cells_stock_adj_rate 
desired_prison_cells_5_year_forecast = prison_population_5_year_forecast*desired_capacity_utilization 
desired_prison_cells_under_construction = Desired_Cell_order_rate*construction_time_weighted_average 
desired_replacement_rate = expected_depreciation_rate 
expectation_adjustment_time = 5 
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expected_depreciation_rate = smth1(depreciation_rate,expectation_adjustment_time) 
indicated_orders = MAX(0,adjustment_for_cells_under_construction+Desired_Cell_order_rate) 
Initial_capacity_gap = .86 
Normal_capacity_utilization = 1 
pct_of_gap_funded = (0.85+sinwave(.15,10))*(1-
CAPACITY.Equilibrium_switch)+1*CAPACITY.Equilibrium_switch 
perceived_cell_growth_percentage = 100*smth1(trend(Prison_Cells,1/3),1) 
perceived_pop_growth_percentage = 
100*smth1(trend(Population.PRISONER_TOTAL,1/3,population_growth_percentage/100),1) 
population_growth_percentage = 0 
prisoner_capacity_per_cell = 1 
PRISON_CAPACITY = (Prison_Cells+quick_build_cells)*prisoner_capacity_per_cell 
prison_cells_5_year_forecast = Prison_Cells*(1+perceived_cell_growth_percentage/100)^5 
prison_cells_stock_adj_rate = delay(prison_cell_5_year_forecast_adjustment,1) 
prison_cell_5_year_forecast_adjustment = (prison_cell_gap_5_year_forecast/(cells_gap_adj_time/3)) 
prison_cell_gap_5_year_forecast = (desired_prison_cells_5_year_forecast-prison_cells_5_year_forecast) 
prison_population_5_year_forecast = 
Population.PRISONER_TOTAL*(1+perceived_pop_growth_percentage/100)^5 
Quick_Build_Capacity_Lifetime = 30 
Quick_build_construction_time = 2 
Quick_build_policy = 0 
State_of_emergency = 0 
time_to_change = 1 
actual_Prison_Capacity = GRAPH(time) 
(1988, 41994), (1989, 44179), (1990, 45427), (1991, 42804), (1992, 43875), (1993, 46239), (1994, 46646), 
(1995, 48291), (1996, 50239), (1997, 53152), (1998, 56329), (1999, 61253), (2000, 62369), (2001, 63346), 
(2002, 63530), (2003, 64046), (2004, 66104), (2005, 67505), (2006, 69394), (2007, 70686), (2008, 71374), 
(2009, 73452) 
Effect_of_cap_util_on_construction = GRAPH(Capacity_connector/Normal_capacity_utilization) 
(0.9, 0.00), (0.933, 0.00), (0.967, 0.00), (1.00, 0.00), (1.03, 0.018), (1.07, 0.037), (1.10, 0.057), (1.13, 0.08), 
(1.17, 0.1), (1.20, 0.1) 
 
CAPACITY.Probation: 
Probation_staff(t) = Probation_staff(t - dt) + (Training_Rate - Quit_Rate) * dt 
INIT Probation_staff = Population.PROBATEE_TOTAL*desired_worker_to_offender_ratio 
INFLOWS: 
Training_Rate = Trainees/training_time 
OUTFLOWS: 
Quit_Rate = Probation_staff/Average_Service_Length 
Trainees(t) = Trainees(t - dt) + (Hiring_Rate - Training_Rate) * dt 
INIT Trainees = Quit_Rate*training_time 
INFLOWS: 
Hiring_Rate = desired_hiring*pct_of_gap_funded 
OUTFLOWS: 
Training_Rate = Trainees/training_time 
Actual_worker_to_offender_ratio = Probation_staff/Population.PROBATEE_TOTAL 
adjustment_for_trainees = (desired_training-Trainees)/trainee_adj_time 
Average_Service_Length = delay1(Normal_Service*Effect_of_Caseload_on_Average_Service_Length,2) 
Custody_Extra = 0 
desired_hiring = MAX(0,adjustment_for_trainees+desired_hiring_rate)/Hiring_time 
desired_hiring_rate = desired_replacement_rate+desired_prison_cells_stock_adj_rate 
desired_prison_cells_stock_adj_rate = (workforce_gap_5_year_forecast/(workforce_gap_adj_time/3)) 
desired_replacement_rate = expected_quit_rate 
desired_training = desired_hiring_rate*training_time 
desired_worker_to_offender_ratio = .025 
desired_workforce_5_year_forecast = 
probation_population_5_year_forecast*desired_worker_to_offender_ratio 
expectation_adt_time = 4 
expected_quit_rate = smth1(Quit_Rate,expectation_adt_time) 
Hiring_time = 1 
Normal_ratio = if(CAPACITY.Equilibrium_switch=0)then(policy_connector)else(.025) 
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Normal_Service = 10 
pct_of_gap_funded = (0.85+sinwave(.15,10))*(1-
CAPACITY.Equilibrium_switch)+1*CAPACITY.Equilibrium_switch 
perceived_pop_growth_percentage = 
100*smth1(trend(Population.PROBATEE_TOTAL,1/3,population_growth_percentage/100),1) 
perceived_workforce_growth_percentage = 100*smth1(trend(Probation_staff,1/3),5) 
policy_connector = .025*(1-
Custody_Extra)+(If(time<2007.5)then(.025*Custody_Extra)else(.02*Custody_Extra)) 
population_growth_percentage = 4*(1-
CAPACITY.Equilibrium_switch)+0*CAPACITY.Equilibrium_switch 
probation_population_5_year_forecast = 
Population.PROBATEE_TOTAL*(1+perceived_pop_growth_percentage/100)^5 
trainee_adj_time = 2 
training_time = 2 
workforce_5_year_forecast = Probation_staff*(1+perceived_workforce_growth_percentage/100)^5 
workforce_gap_5_year_forecast = (desired_workforce_5_year_forecast-workforce_5_year_forecast) 
workforce_gap_adj_time = 4 
Effect_of_Caseload_on_Average_Service_Length = 
GRAPH(Actual_worker_to_offender_ratio/Normal_ratio) 
(0.00, 1.06), (0.333, 1.06), (0.667, 1.03), (1.00, 1.00), (1.33, 0.956), (1.67, 0.902), (2.00, 0.77), (2.33, 0.62), 
(2.67, 0.542), (3.00, 0.495), (3.33, 0.47), (3.67, 0.45), (4.00, 0.45) 
 
Population: 
Awaiting_Trial_and_Sentence(t) = Awaiting_Trial_and_Sentence(t - dt) + (First_Time_Offender_entry_rate 
+ prison_recidivism_rate + Probation_recid_rate - Probation_entry_rate - Prison_Entry_rate) * dt 
INIT Awaiting_Trial_and_Sentence = 42000*(1-Equilibrium_Switch)+2000*Equilibrium_Switch 
INFLOWS: 
First_Time_Offender_entry_rate = 
crimes_resulting_in_sentence*fraction_of_crimes_committed_by_first_offenders+FO_SHOCK 
prison_recidivism_rate = 
(RELEASED_OFFENDERS*Recidivism.PRISON_FRACTIONAL_RECIDIVISM)/recidivism_detection_ti
me 
Probation_recid_rate = 
Released__Probatees*Recidivism.Probation_Recidivism_Fraction/recidivism_detection_time 
OUTFLOWS: 
Probation_entry_rate = Awaiting_Trial_and_Sentence*(1-
Attitudes.IMPRISONMENT_FRACTION)/Processing_Time 
Prison_Entry_rate = 
(Awaiting_Trial_and_Sentence*Attitudes.IMPRISONMENT_FRACTION)/Processing_Time 
CUSTODY_Extra_Population(t) = CUSTODY_Extra_Population(t - dt) + (LSO_Entering_custody_extra - 
LSO_Release_from_custody_extra) * dt 
INIT CUSTODY_Extra_Population = 
LSO_Entering_custody_extra*LESS_SERIOUS_OFFENDER_Parole_Length 
INFLOWS: 
LSO_Entering_custody_extra = If(Probation.Custody_Extra=0)then(0)else(Cplus_connector) 
OUTFLOWS: 
LSO_Release_from_custody_extra = 
CUSTODY_Extra_Population/LESS_SERIOUS_OFFENDER_Parole_Length 
ON_PROBATION(t) = ON_PROBATION(t - dt) + (Probation_entry_rate - Probation_Exit_Rate) * dt 
INIT ON_PROBATION = Probation_entry_rate*Probation_length 
INFLOWS: 
Probation_entry_rate = Awaiting_Trial_and_Sentence*(1-
Attitudes.IMPRISONMENT_FRACTION)/Processing_Time 
OUTFLOWS: 
Probation_Exit_Rate = ON_PROBATION/Probation_length 
PAROLE_POPULATION(t) = PAROLE_POPULATION(t - dt) + (Entering_parole_rate - 
Parole_Release_Rate) * dt 
INIT PAROLE_POPULATION = Entering_parole_rate*Parole_Length 
INFLOWS: 
Entering_parole_rate = SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE 
OUTFLOWS: 
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Parole_Release_Rate = PAROLE_POPULATION/Parole_Length 
PRISON_POPULATION(t) = PRISON_POPULATION(t - dt) + (Prison_Entry_rate - 
LESS_SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE - short_sentence__completion_rate) * dt 
INIT PRISON_POPULATION = Prison_Entry_rate*Attitudes.ShortSentence 
INFLOWS: 
Prison_Entry_rate = 
(Awaiting_Trial_and_Sentence*Attitudes.IMPRISONMENT_FRACTION)/Processing_Time 
OUTFLOWS: 
LESS_SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE = PRISON_POPULATION*(1-
Attitudes.offence_seriousness)/Attitudes.ShortSentence 
short_sentence__completion_rate = 
PRISON_POPULATION*Attitudes.offence_seriousness/Attitudes.ShortSentence 
Reformed_prisoners(t) = Reformed_prisoners(t - dt) + (Prisoner_Reform_rate - Offender_Death_Rate) * dt 
INIT Reformed_prisoners = Prisoner_Reform_rate*Average_Lifespan 
INFLOWS: 
Prisoner_Reform_rate = (RELEASED_OFFENDERS*(1-
Recidivism.PRISON_FRACTIONAL_RECIDIVISM))/recidivism_detection_time 
OUTFLOWS: 
Offender_Death_Rate = Reformed_prisoners/Average_Lifespan 
Reformed_Probatees(t) = Reformed_Probatees(t - dt) + (Probatee_Reform__rate - Death_rate) * dt 
INIT Reformed_Probatees = Probatee_Reform__rate*Average_Lifespan 
INFLOWS: 
Probatee_Reform__rate = Released__Probatees*(1-
Recidivism.Probation_Recidivism_Fraction)/recidivism_detection_time 
OUTFLOWS: 
Death_rate = Reformed_Probatees/Average_Lifespan 
RELEASED_OFFENDERS(t) = RELEASED_OFFENDERS(t - dt) + 
(LESS_SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE + SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE - 
Prisoner_Reform_rate - prison_recidivism_rate) * dt 
INIT RELEASED_OFFENDERS = 
(LESS_SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE+SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE)*recidivis
m_detection_time 
INFLOWS: 
LESS_SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE = PRISON_POPULATION*(1-
Attitudes.offence_seriousness)/Attitudes.ShortSentence 
SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE = SERIOUS_OFFENDERS/Attitudes.ExtraSentence 
OUTFLOWS: 
Prisoner_Reform_rate = (RELEASED_OFFENDERS*(1-
Recidivism.PRISON_FRACTIONAL_RECIDIVISM))/recidivism_detection_time 
prison_recidivism_rate = 
(RELEASED_OFFENDERS*Recidivism.PRISON_FRACTIONAL_RECIDIVISM)/recidivism_detection_ti
me 
Released__Probatees(t) = Released__Probatees(t - dt) + (Probation_Exit_Rate - Probatee_Reform__rate - 
Probation_recid_rate) * dt 
INIT Released__Probatees = Probation_Exit_Rate*recidivism_detection_time 
INFLOWS: 
Probation_Exit_Rate = ON_PROBATION/Probation_length 
OUTFLOWS: 
Probatee_Reform__rate = Released__Probatees*(1-
Recidivism.Probation_Recidivism_Fraction)/recidivism_detection_time 
Probation_recid_rate = 
Released__Probatees*Recidivism.Probation_Recidivism_Fraction/recidivism_detection_time 
SERIOUS_OFFENDERS(t) = SERIOUS_OFFENDERS(t - dt) + (short_sentence__completion_rate - 
SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE) * dt 
INIT SERIOUS_OFFENDERS = short_sentence__completion_rate*Attitudes.ExtraSentence 
INFLOWS: 
short_sentence__completion_rate = 
PRISON_POPULATION*Attitudes.offence_seriousness/Attitudes.ShortSentence 
OUTFLOWS: 
SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE = SERIOUS_OFFENDERS/Attitudes.ExtraSentence 
Average_Lifespan = 55 
87 
Cplus_connector = If(time>2007.5)then(LESS_SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE)else(0) 
crimes_resulting_in_sentence = 
fraction_of_crimes_reported_captured_and_proceeded_against*Total_crimes 
English_population = The_once_and_future_English_population*(1-
Equilibrium_Switch)+Equilibrium_population*Equilibrium_Switch 
Equilibrium_population = 20000 
Equilibrium_switch = .Equilibrium_master_switch 
extra_pop = Untried_Prisoners + Non_Criminal_Prisoners + Convicted_Unsentenced_Prisoners 
FO_SHOCK = (step(1000,1990.5))*.FIRST_OFFENDER_Shock 
fraction_of_crimes_committed_by_first_offenders = .10*(1-Equilibrium_switch)+1*Equilibrium_switch 
fraction_of_crimes_reported_captured_and_proceeded_against = .11*(1-
Equilibrium_Switch)+1*Equilibrium_Switch 
LESS_SERIOUS_OFFENDER_Parole_Length = Attitudes.ShortSentence 
Parole_Length = Portion_of_sentence_on_parole*(Attitudes.LongSentence) 
Portion_of_sentence_on_parole = .2 
PRISONER_TOTAL = PRISON_POPULATION+SERIOUS_OFFENDERS+extra_pop*(1-
Equilibrium_switch) 
PROBATEE_TOTAL = ON_PROBATION+PAROLE_POPULATION+CUSTODY_Extra_Population 
Probation_length = 1 
Processing_Time = .5*(1-Equilibrium_Switch)+1*Equilibrium_Switch 
recidivism_detection_time = 2 
REFERENCE_TOTAL_PRISON_POP = 
actual_sentenced_Prisoner_Population+Convicted_Unsentenced_Prisoners+Non_Criminal_Prisoners+Untrie
d_Prisoners 
Total_crimes = English_population*Attitudes.CRIMES_PER_PERSON 
actual_probation_pop = GRAPH(time) 
(1988, 75000), (1989, 79000), (1990, 87000), (1991, 90000), (1992, 90000), (1993, 89000), (1994, 97000), 
(1995, 97000), (1996, 97000), (1997, 100000), (1998, 105000), (1999, 115000), (2000, 110000), (2001, 
109000), (2002, 109000), (2003, 116000), (2004, 121000), (2005, 128000), (2006, 137000), (2007, 147000), 
(2008, 150000), (2009, 147000) 
actual_sentenced_Prisoner_Population = GRAPH(time) 
(1988, 38000), (1989, 38000), (1990, 38000), (1991, 36000), (1992, 35000), (1993, 35000), (1994, 33000), 
(1995, 36000), (1996, 39000), (1997, 43000), (1998, 49000), (1999, 52000), (2000, 51000), (2001, 53000), 
(2002, 54000), (2003, 57000), (2004, 59000), (2005, 61000), (2006, 62000), (2007, 63000), (2008, 66000), 
(2009, 68000) 
Convicted_Unsentenced_Prisoners = GRAPH(time) 
(1988, 1551), (1989, 1664), (1990, 1819), (1991, 1833), (1992, 1942), (1993, 2013), (1994, 2714), (1995, 
3188), (1996, 3069), (1997, 3161), (1998, 3189), (1999, 4116), (2000, 4899), (2001, 4214), (2002, 4261), 
(2003, 5204), (2004, 5177), (2005, 4779), (2006, 4780), (2007, 5003), (2008, 4457), (2009, 4690) 
Historic_English_population = GRAPH(time) 
(1988, 5.7e+007), (1989, 5.7e+007), (1990, 5.7e+007), (1991, 5.7e+007), (1992, 5.7e+007), (1993, 
5.8e+007), (1994, 5.8e+007), (1995, 5.8e+007), (1996, 5.8e+007), (1997, 5.8e+007), (1998, 5.8e+007), 
(1999, 5.8e+007), (2000, 5.9e+007), (2001, 5.9e+007), (2002, 5.9e+007), (2003, 5.9e+007), (2004, 6e+007), 
(2005, 6e+007), (2006, 6e+007), (2007, 6.1e+007), (2008, 6.1e+007) 
Non_Criminal_Prisoners = GRAPH(time) 
(1988, 270), (1989, 227), (1990, 220), (1991, 201), (1992, 300), (1993, 308), (1994, 574), (1995, 640), 
(1996, 649), (1997, 633), (1998, 557), (1999, 555), (2000, 548), (2001, 581), (2002, 1129), (2003, 831), 
(2004, 1145), (2005, 1017), (2006, 1069), (2007, 1422), (2008, 1289), (2009, 1520) 
reference_frac_recid_rate = GRAPH(time) 
(1988, 0.55), (1989, 0.54), (1990, 0.52), (1991, 0.53), (1992, 0.52), (1993, 0.54), (1994, 0.57), (1995, 0.58), 
(1996, 0.57), (1997, 0.58), (1998, 0.6), (1999, 0.6), (2000, 0.65), (2001, 0.61), (2002, 0.67), (2003, 0.66), 
(2004, 0.65) 
reference_imprisonment_fraction = GRAPH(time) 
(1988, 0.55), (1988, 0.53), (1989, 0.5), (1990, 0.45), (1991, 0.46), (1992, 0.45), (1993, 0.43), (1994, 0.43), 
(1995, 0.45), (1996, 0.42), (1997, 0.43), (1998, 0.42), (1999, 0.43), (2000, 0.44), (2001, 0.43), (2002, 0.43), 
(2003, 0.42), (2004, 0.42), (2005, 0.4), (2006, 0.37), (2007, 0.37), (2008, 0.36) 
The_once_and_future_English_population = GRAPH(time) 
(1988, 5.7e+007), (1989, 5.7e+007), (1990, 5.7e+007), (1991, 5.7e+007), (1992, 5.7e+007), (1993, 
5.8e+007), (1994, 5.8e+007), (1995, 5.8e+007), (1996, 5.8e+007), (1997, 5.8e+007), (1998, 5.8e+007), 
(1999, 5.9e+007), (2000, 5.9e+007), (2001, 5.9e+007), (2002, 5.9e+007), (2003, 5.9e+007), (2004, 6e+007), 
(2005, 6e+007), (2006, 6e+007), (2007, 6.1e+007), (2008, 6.1e+007), (2009, 6.1e+007), (2010, 6.2e+007), 
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(2011, 6.2e+007), (2012, 6.3e+007), (2013, 6.3e+007), (2014, 6.3e+007), (2015, 6.4e+007), (2016, 
6.4e+007), (2017, 6.4e+007), (2018, 6.4e+007), (2019, 6.4e+007), (2020, 6.5e+007), (2021, 6.5e+007), 
(2022, 6.5e+007), (2023, 6.5e+007), (2024, 6.5e+007), (2025, 6.6e+007), (2026, 6.6e+007), (2027, 
6.7e+007), (2028, 6.7e+007) 
Untried_Prisoners = GRAPH(time) 
(1988, 9611), (1989, 9776), (1990, 8679), (1991, 8071), (1992, 8215), (1993, 8076), (1994, 7960), (1995, 
9169), (1996, 7950), (1997, 8432), (1998, 8563), (1999, 8358), (2000, 7932), (2001, 7219), (2002, 6801), 
(2003, 7877), (2004, 7896), (2005, 7716), (2006, 8084), (2007, 8064), (2008, 8387), (2009, 8750) 
 
Recidivism: 
actual_change_to_recidivism(t) = actual_change_to_recidivism(t - dt) + (change_to_recidivism_reduction) * 
dt 
INIT actual_change_to_recidivism = potential_deliverable_recidivism_reduction 
INFLOWS: 
change_to_recidivism_reduction = (potential_deliverable_recidivism_reduction-
actual_change_to_recidivism)/time_to_implement_reduction 
Reported_Capacity_Utilization(t) = Reported_Capacity_Utilization(t - dt) + 
(CURRENT_CAPACITY_UTILIZATION - Experienced_Capacity_Utililzation) * dt 
INIT Reported_Capacity_Utilization = 1 
INFLOWS: 
CURRENT_CAPACITY_UTILIZATION = 
Prison.CAPACITY_UTILIZATION/Capacity_Utilization_report_time 
OUTFLOWS: 
Experienced_Capacity_Utililzation = 
Reported_Capacity_Utilization/(Population.recidivism_detection_time*.5) 
Reported_ratio(t) = Reported_ratio(t - dt) + (Current_ratio - Experienced_ratio) * dt 
INIT Reported_ratio = Current_ratio*Population.Probation_length 
INFLOWS: 
Current_ratio = Probation.Actual_worker_to_offender_ratio/Caseload_report_time 
OUTFLOWS: 
Experienced_ratio = Reported_ratio/Population.Probation_length 
Capacity_Utilization_report_time = 1 
Caseload_report_time = 1 
Completion_time = 1 
Equilibrium_switch = .Equilibrium_master_switch 
Fraction_potentially_completing_programs = 
(Less_serious_offender_completion+Serious_Offender_completion)/Total_release 
Less_serious_offender_completion = 
Population.LESS_SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE*Short_sentence_length_effect_on_completio
n 
long_sentence_and_completion_ratio = 
(Attitudes.LongSentence+Population.Parole_Length)/Completion_time 
Normal_capacity_utilization = 1 
Normal_ratio_of_sentence_to_completion = .96 
Normal_Rehab_Effect = rehab_connector 
Normal_reported_capacity_utilization = 1 
Normal_short_sentence_completion = 1 
potential_deliverable_recidivism_reduction = 
(poterntial__recidivism_reduction*Effect_of_CAPACITY_UTILIZATION_on_rehabilitation_program_deli
very) 
poterntial__recidivism_reduction = 
Round(Normal_Rehab_Effect*Fraction_potentially_completing_programs*10000)/10000 
PRISON_FRACTIONAL_RECIDIVISM = 
MAX(0,(Attitudes.Prisoner_perception_of_the_benefits_of_crime-actual_change_to_recidivism)) 
Probation_Recidivism_Fraction = 
Attitudes.Probatee_perception_of_the_benefits_of_crime*EFFECT_OF_WORKER_TO_OFFENDER_RAT
IO_ON_RECIDIVISM 
rehab_connector = rehab_equilib_input*(1-
Rehab_Policy)+((If(time<2007.5)then(rehab_equilib_input)else(Rehab_policy_input))*Rehab_Policy) 
rehab_equilib_input = .2*(1-Equilibrium_Switch)+.212164*Equilibrium_Switch  
Rehab_Policy = 0 
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Rehab_policy_input = .4 
Serious_Offender_completion = 
Population.SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE*Long_Sentence_length_effect_on_completion 
short_sentnce_and_completion_ratio = 
(Population.LESS_SERIOUS_OFFENDER_Parole_Length+Attitudes.ShortSentence)/Completion_time 
time_to_implement_reduction = 2 
Total_release = 
Round(Population.SERIOUS_OFFENDER_RELEASE_RATE+Population.LESS_SERIOUS_OFFENDER_
RELEASE_RATE) 
CAPACITY_UTILIZATION_EFFECT_ON_SENTENCE = 
GRAPH(Experienced_Capacity_Utililzation/Normal_reported_capacity_utilization) 
(0.6, 1.34), (0.65, 1.34), (0.7, 1.33), (0.75, 1.33), (0.8, 1.32), (0.85, 1.31), (0.9, 1.30), (0.95, 1.21), (1.00, 
1.00), (1.05, 0.795), (1.10, 0.618), (1.15, 0.504), (1.20, 0.45), (1.25, 0.426), (1.30, 0.408), (1.35, 0.396), 
(1.40, 0.39), (1.45, 0.39), (1.50, 0.39) 
Effect_of_CAPACITY_UTILIZATION_on_rehabilitation_program_delivery = 
GRAPH(Experienced_Capacity_Utililzation/Normal_capacity_utilization) 
(0.8, 1.10), (0.85, 1.10), (0.9, 1.10), (0.95, 1.04), (1.00, 1.00), (1.05, 0.9), (1.10, 0.86), (1.15, 0.82), (1.20, 
0.805), (1.25, 0.8), (1.30, 0.8) 
EFFECT_OF_WORKER_TO_OFFENDER_RATIO_ON_RECIDIVISM = 
GRAPH(Experienced_ratio/Probation.Normal_ratio) 
(0.00, 1.41), (0.333, 1.34), (0.667, 1.20), (1.00, 1.00), (1.33, 0.933), (1.67, 0.909), (2.00, 0.898), (2.33, 
0.888), (2.67, 0.877), (3.00, 0.874), (3.33, 0.87), (3.67, 0.863), (4.00, 0.863) 
Long_Sentence_length_effect_on_completion = 
GRAPH(long_sentence_and_completion_ratio/Normal_ratio_of_sentence_to_completion) 
(0.00, 0.005), (0.2, 0.01), (0.4, 0.055), (0.6, 0.165), (0.8, 0.595), (1.00, 0.75), (1.20, 0.825), (1.40, 0.875), 
(1.60, 0.93), (1.80, 0.95), (2.00, 0.955) 
Short_sentence_length_effect_on_completion = 
GRAPH(short_sentnce_and_completion_ratio/Normal_short_sentence_completion) 
(0.00, 0.005), (0.2, 0.01), (0.4, 0.055), (0.6, 0.165), (0.8, 0.595), (1.00, 0.75), (1.20, 0.825), (1.40, 0.875), 
(1.60, 0.93), (1.80, 0.95), (2.00, 0.955) 
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Appendix 2: Full Causal Loop Diagram 
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Appendix 3: First Offender Inflow 
As there is no pre existing statistic for the number of offenders who have never 
been to prison or through the probation system we have created an input based upon the 
English population and the crime rate. Sentencing statistics give us an indication that 
approximately 10% of crimes result in sentence. The fraction of first offenders has been 
taken as 13%. This reflects the number of offenders entering prison who have never before 
received a caution, fine or other form of punishment. In reality both of the fraction of 
crimes resulting in sentence and the fraction of first offenders sent to prison would change 
from year to year. Observation from elsewhere in the system indicate that the first offender 
fraction, and crime resolution trend actually have quite a low variance. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Extreme Condition Test 
If a model continues to operate according to predicted behavior under extreme 
circumstances we can be more confident that the model operates as intended under normal 
circumstances. Whist creating the model each new variable was tested according to its 
behavior at both ends of the spectrum. Variable equations were only accepted if they 
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provided the hypothesized behavior or gave grounds to improve the hypothesis. Extreme 
conditions test were repeated as model structures were connected together. Extreme 
conditions tests provided key insights into the operation of recidivism and rehabilitation in 
particular. In this section we will drop a key variable value to zero in each sector20 . 
Extreme values will be applied to sentence lengths, the effectiveness of rehabilitation, and 
building delays. 
• Short Sentence Lengths fall to 0.001 
Dropping normal statutory sentence lengths to 0 will produce a division error. In order 
to test its extreme value we therefore set it to 0.001. It was predicted that with a low short 
sentence length the prisoner population will instantly fall, as prisoners are released. The 
prison population would then bounce back as politicians and judges alter sentence lengths. 
Prison population will eventually fall into equilibrium at a level near 0. Actual sentence 
lengths will follow the same trend. Capacity utilization will drop sharply, before rising 
again to a level lower than its initial value. Lower capacity utilization, should invoke 
Braess law; as capacity increases there is a tendency to use the capacity more – causing 
sentence lengths to rise once more. The drop in capacity utilization and rise in serious 
offender sentence lengths will increase rehabilitation and force recidivism to fall.  
The predictions were mostly proved correct. However the recidivism rate does not 
quite behave as predicted. The logic for the actual behavior is quite sound. There is an 
initial spike in the recidivism rate caused by the sudden release of prisoners. After the spike 
the recidivism rate falls. The unpredicted behavior is the s shaped growth in recidivism 
after 1997. As capacity utilization rises once more Braess law has a lower effect on 
sentence lengths. As sentence lengths go down recidivism increases. 
 
                                                 
20
 These tests were also conducted at extreme high values. 
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Appendix 5: Reference mode sensitivity to changes in perception of recividivism 
adjustment time 
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Appendix 6: State of Emergency Policy 
The state of emergency policy will involve setting up emergency rule to shorten the 
delay times in loop B1. Our analysis (in appendix 4) indicated that the system was most 
sensitive to changes in the cell gap adjustment time.  So in the emergency policy, whenever 
the reported capacity utilization21 reaches a certain level the cell gap adjustment time can 
be reduced – so adjustment takes place over 3 years instead of 5 years whenever capacity 
utilization is above 1.03.  
Equilibrium tests for the state of emergency policy 
 We tested this policy in equilibrium with a condition that whenever capacity 
utilization exceeds 1.03 the cell gap adjustment time will drop to 3 years (Figure 68). The 
policy proved successful in equilibrium. Capacity utilization dropped at a slightly faster 
rate. The fact that the difference was marginal is encouraging when one considers just how 
much the population varies from year to year in the real world. 
 
Figure 68: Equilibrium test: Before (1) and after cell gap adjustment policy 
 
State of emergency policy: scenario testing 
                                                 
21
 Reported capacity utilization is delayed so we are actually talking about ‘last years’ capacity utilization. 
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It is clear from the reactions to the three scenarios that reducing the adjustment time 
does help to relieve problems of a lack of capacity utilization, with only a small risk of 
running into excess capacity problems. However with an emergency adjustment time of 3 
years, there is only a limited gain in scenario’s 1 and 2.  
 
Figure 69: State of emergency under 3 different scenarios. 
One of the problems with this policy is that it relies on an instant ‘switch’. The 
increase in pressure to close the gap between forecast population and forecast capacity is 
more likely to happen gradually, and it is that gradation that creates a problem. If the 
shortened capacity adjustment continues for too long the system will overproduce capacity. 
 
Appendix 7: The Publicity Policy: Scenario Testing 
The following graphs depict behavior under the “publicity policy”. From 2008 the 
perception of the crime rate is (1) kept the same, (2) dropped to 1 year, (3) raised to ten 
years. The changes to the perception of the crime rate produced inconsistent results 
between the scenarios and was therefore rejected. The graphs below are of scenarios with a 
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reducing prison population, near flat growth in prison population and a rapidly rising prison 
population 
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Capacity  utilization comparison
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Appendix 8: Guide to the Control Screen of the model 
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Appendix 9: A very basic model guide 
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